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# Georgics of the Mind and the Architecture of Fortune: Francis Bacon's Therapeutic Ethics

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**Abstract:** This essay complements recent work by Soreana Corneanu situating Bacon's epistemology in a larger lineage of literature concerning 'cultura animi' in early modern Europe, by focusing on Bacon's conception of a therapeutic philosophical 'Georgics of the mind' in *The Advancement of Learning*, the *Essays*, and other texts. We aim to show firstly (in Part 2) how Bacon's conception of human nature, and the importance of habit and custom, reflects the ancient pagan thinkers' justifications of philosophical therapeutics. Attention will also be paid in this connection to Bacon's sensitivity to another marker of ancient therapeutic philosophy as Pierre Hadot in particular has recently presented it: the proliferation of different rhetorical and literary forms aiming at different pedagogic, therapeutic, and psychogogic aims. Part 3 then will examine Bacon's changes in practical or 'magistral' philosophy, carried out on the therapeutic ethical grounds which Part 2 has examined, but proposing a much more active 'architecture of fortune' to philosophical and political aspirants.

## Introduction: Through the Gates of Horn

> We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon saith, "*Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum: nam inde procedunt actiones vitæ* [Keep thy heart with all thy diligence; for out of it are the actions of life. (*Prov.* 4.23)]" In the handling of this science, those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. *But how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and unprofitably* …[1]

1 Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* (1605), book II, chapter xx, section/paragraph 1 (italics added). Hereafter references to this work, will be abbreviated AL, then by book

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Thus Francis Bacon begins the four chapters of Book II of *Advancement of Learning* devoted to 'magistral' or practical philosophy, that part of human philosophy concerning will, the appetites and affections.[2] According to Bacon, this magistral philosophy is, or ought to have been, divided into two parts. The first he calls 'the platform of the good'. It concerns the nature of the good, and the kinds or degrees amongst the different goods human beings desire.[3] Although he will dispute key aspects of the 'pagan' understanding of the sovereign good and its 'philosopher's heaven',[4] Bacon argues that this part of practical philosophy has been copiously, even too copiously, addressed. The 'excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers,' Bacon opines, 'have persuaded unto virtue most effectually, … representing her in state and majesty.'[5] As for the second part, it involves a much more humble, sadly neglected 'husbandry and tillage' or 'regiment and culture' of ethical conduct.[6] Bacon calls it the 'Georgics of the mind',[7] taking this name from Virgil: not *qua* author of the splendid *Aenead*, but as someone 'who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry, as of the heroic acts of Aeneas …'[8] As

(roman numerals capitalised), chapter (roman non-capitalised), section/paragraph (Arabic numerals). The full text of the 1605 English-language text is available at www-site http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5500. Since *Novum Organum* is also frequently cited below, it is referred to in similar manner as 'NO', followed by the book (Roman Capitals), then the section/aphorism (Arabic numerals): NO I.12, etc. The full text of the English-language text is available at http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm/. Bacon's individual essays, when cited, are given by the title, and I have used the edition in *Bacon's Essays, including his Moral and Historical Works, namely The Essays, The Colours of Good and Evil; Ornamenta Rationalia, or Elegant Sentences; Short Notes for Civil Conversation; Advancement of Learning; Wisdom of the Ancients; New Atlantis; Apophthegms; History of Henry VII, … VIII, … Elizabeth, with Memoir, Notes and Glossary* (London: Frederick Warned and co., 1911). The full text of the English version of the *Essays* is available at www-site http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/575.

2 Cf. AL II.v.2; AL II.ix.1; AL II.xii.1.

3 AL II.xx.4.

4 AL II.xx.5. See Part 3 below.

5 AL II.xxii.13.

6 AL II.xxii.16.

7 AL II.x.3.

8 AL II.xx.3.

Bacon's description of this neglected part of practical philosophy proceeds, he uses also a further metaphor widespread in Greek and Roman practical philosophy after Socrates to describe his meaning: that of a philosophical therapeutics or 'medicining' of the soul.[9] A complete magistral philosophy must come to know 'the diseases and infirmities of the mind', Bacon says, as well as painting stately theoretical pictures of human nature, the virtues, and the good. Then only can philosophy help to actually 'cure' these ailments.[10] And only thus, in another trope Bacon takes from Virgil, will philosophical ethics become more than a gate of ivory (through which false idols come) to become a 'gate of horn' through which 'true visions' and real ethical reformation can pass.[11]

Francis Bacon's name is not the first that springs to mind for us today when we consider the *motif* of philosophy as therapy. The philosopher and Lord Chancellor is seldom read except in limited extracts and by historians of ideas. Where Bacon is studied by philosophy students (generally in courses on the history and philosophy of science) Voltaire's celebrated depiction of him as the inventor of modern experimental science[12] characterizes the way he is seen, for better and for worse. In the 20th century, Bacon has been influentially depicted as the progenitor of the kind of instrumental reason that led to political totalitarianism (in

9 For recent studies on this ancient therapeutic metaphor for philosophy, see Martha Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); André-Jean Voelke, *La Philosophie Comme Thérapie de l'Âme: Etudes de Philosophie Hellénistique* (Academic Press Fribourg, 1993).

10 AL II.xxi.5. cf. AL I.iv-v on the 'distempers' and 'peccant humours' of the mind, and Soreana Corneanu, *Regimens of the Minds* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 84-94, on the predominance of the therapeutic metaphor in Bacon's epistemology or metaphilosophy.

11 The reference is again to Virgil, *Aenead*, VI 893-7: 'Two gates the silent house of Sleep adorn; /Of polish'd ivory this, that of transparent horn:/ True visions thro' transparent horn arise; / Thro' polish'd ivory pass deluding lies.'

12 Voltaire, 'Lettre XIII: On Francis Bacon' from *Letters on the English or Lettres Philosophiques*, c. 1778 (from *French and English philosophers: Descartes, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hobbes : with introductions and notes*. New York : P.F. Collier, c1910. Series: The Harvard classics v. 34) at www-site http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1778voltaire-bacon.asp.

the work of Adorno and Horkheimer)[13] or a newly reductive and destructive approach to nonhuman nature. [14] Again, this is hardly a likely profile for a thinker we might nominate as interesting for a consideration of the therapeutic ends of philosophical inquiry. Differently, studies of Bacon by Stephen Gaukroger and Peter Harrison have argued that it is with Bacon's natural philosophy that, for the first time, the idea of philosophical inquiry being *collectivized* is glimpsed.[15] In both the new philosophy's benefits—'a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.'[16]—and in its execution—which will require many inquirers, each undertaking particular studies[17]—Baconian natural philosophy challenges the ancient idea that the first beneficiaries of philosophy, undertaken by individuals, should be those individuals themselves, their souls, or a closeted élite.[18]

Yet there is no doubt that these 20th century images of Bacon do not closely correspond to how the philosopher-Lord Chancellor was seen,

13 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (USA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1-2.

14 Carolyn Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1980); 'The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature', *Isis*, 2006, 97:513-533; Theodore Roszak, *Where the Wasteland Ends* (USA: Doubleday Books, 1972).

15 Stephen Gaukroger, *Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 11-12, 224-226; and esp. 125-9; cf. Stephen Gaukroger, *Emergence of a Scientific Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP), 203, 377; Peter Harrison, 'Francis Bacon, Natural Philosophy, and the Cultivation of the Mind', Perspectives on Science 2012, vol. 20, no. 2, 139-158; esp. 48-152. In Harrison's work generally, Bacon's acceptance of the Christian narrative of the fall, and the need therefore for a philosophy of works to attenuate its negative consequences 'by the sweat of the brow', is emphasised.

16 AL I.v.11.

17 On the need for collectivisation of inquiry in Bacon, cf. AL II. Proem. 13; NO I.57; I.108; I. 113; Rose-Mary Sargent, 'Bacon as an advocate for cooperative scientific research', in Markku Peltone ed.*The Cambridge Companion to Bacon* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 146-171; also F.H. Anderson, *Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (New York: Octagon Books), 270.

18 Cf. also James A. Lancaster, 'Natural Knowledge as a Propaedeutic to Self-Betterment: Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Natural History', *Early Science and Medicine* 17 (2012) 181-196.

either by his immediate contemporaries, or later in the romantic era. In one sense, the predominance of our image of Bacon as the inventor of reductive, instrumental natural science is a tribute to the extraordinary success of Bacon's *Novum Organum* of 1620, whose strictures concerning a new inductive method in natural philosophy was to deeply shape later British natural science, and inspire the Royal Society.[19] Nevertheless, as Brian Vickers in particular has protested,[20] our later modern oppositions between the human and natural sciences were not yet operative in Bacon's time or work.[21] His contemporaries knew and extoled Bacon, sometimes in the most extraordinary terms, as the legatee or improver of the entire literary and philosophical culture of 'insolent Greece and haughty Rome,' a tenth muse bringing the entire choir together.[22] Bacon's effortless command of the English, Latin, and other European languages—evident even in his most austere philosophical works—speaks to his continuity with the great tradition of Renaissance and classical rhetorical culture.[23] The very shape of Bacon's *oeuvre*, in which nearly all literary media are adopted, from (his newly-invented) prosaic natural histories, through treatises, dialogues, letters, pseudonymous

19 *NO* book II propounds for the first time, in 'initiative' style (AL II.xvii.4), a method of discovery in natural philosophy (by collection and tabulation of empirical matter, then inductive elimination of possible hypotheses, coupled with pointers to 27 kinds of 'instances' to aid this induction). Good accounts of Bacon's 'logic of discovery' can be found in F.H. Anderson, *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (New York: Octagon Books, 1975), 217-278; Lisa Jardine, *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Mary Hesse, 'Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science' in *Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 114-139.

20 Brian Vickers, 'The Myth of Bacon's Anti-Humanism,' in Jill Kraye, M.W.F. Stone eds., *Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2000), 135-158 (especially Vicker's opening and closing statements).

21 Let alone the late 19th century projects in scientistic reduction of all inquiry. Cf. John L. Harrison, Bacon's View of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the Imagination, in in *Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 253-271.

22 The *locus classicus* is the *Manes Verulamiani: Sacred to the memory of The Right Honourable Lord Francis Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans. London. From the Press of John Haviland, 1626*, at www-site http://hiwaay.net/~paul/bacon/manes/verulam.html, last accessed August 2013.

23 Cf. Brian Vickers, *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

works, masques, apophthegms, essays, a fictive utopia, a short work on rhetorical 'colors', and one on the deciphering of ancient 'parabolic' myths, shows the great distance between the historical Bacon of the 17th century, and what the disastrous history of the 20th century has made of his name.[24]

Arguably Bacon's greatest philosophical work, *The Advancement of Learning* (1605, republished and expanded in Latin as the first volume of his *Great Instauration* in 1623), anticipates the new natural philosophy in only one small corner of its voluminous purview.[25] Book II of this work, remarkably, undertakes a survey of the present state of all forms of intellectual inquiry in divine, natural, and human philosophy, concerning their means of discovery, learning, memory, and tradition or transmission.[26] With regal assurance, Bacon singles out those parts of human learning he sees to be 'deficient', suggesting keys to others for their renewal, advancement, or augmentation.[27] Nothing in this work suggests that Bacon holds out the ideal of a single, all-reducing, mathematised scientific method. Indeed, echoing Aristotle, Bacon explicitly rejects the possibility when it comes to understanding human affairs:



24 Bacon famously claimed that it was his *Essays*, as well as or in place of any other contributions, that might 'last as long as books last', in the 'Dedication' to the same. For a single-volume compilation of Bacon's writings on civic, historical and moral subjects, see *Bacon's Essays, including his Moral and Historical Works, namely The Essays, The Colours of Good and Evil; Ornamenta Rationalia, or Elegant Sentences; Short Notes for Civil Conversation; Advancement of Learning; Wisdom of the Ancients; New Atlantis; Apophthegms; History of Henry VII, … VIII, … Elizabeth, with Memoir, Notes and Glossary* (London: Frederick Warned and co., 1911) This is near half of Bacon's acknowledged *oeuvre*.

25 Cf. *AL* II.i (on natural history); II.vii (on physics and metaphysics); II.xiii-xiv (on 'judgment,' and the need for a new induction).

26 AL II.xii.3.

27 For the description of this task, see the 'Proem' to *Advancement of Learning* Book II, esp. paragraph 15: 'Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not improved and converted by the industry of man, to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation, and … serve to excite voluntary endeavours.'

> For there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed.[28] And howsoever contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method …[29]

Although Bacon characteristically finds telling 'similitudes' between human and nonhuman nature in that part of *Advancement* given over to practical philosophy,[30] what strikes a contemporary reader most about these chapters is how deep Bacon's debt is to 'the ancients' whom he so often, so powerfully critiques.[31] Our concern here is to show how Bacon, a key figure in the birth of modern thought, advocates in *The Advancement of Learning* for a renewal of the ancient Hellenistic and Roman idea of therapeutic philosophical ethics, as a distinct area of practical or 'magistral' philosophy which he finds deficient in his times. It is, Bacon muses:

> … exceeding strange that [such a philosophical therapeutics] is not reduced to written inquiry; the rather, because it consisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant; and such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books.[32]

28 cf. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) book I, chapter 3; also *NE* II.2.

29 II.xvii.9. Bacon takes up, to rebut, the anticipated charge that his new method in natural philosophy will usurp or destroy the place of the humanistic disciplines in *Novum Organum* Book I, avowing that 'we plainly declare, that the system we offer will not be very suitable for such purposes …' and saying of these humane studies, that we 'cherish their practice, cultivation, and honor,' all at NO I.128. The fourth step of the full 'method' of discovery Bacon begins to lay out in *Novum Organum* II, likewise, is listed as 'Varying the Investigation according to the nature of the Subject.' (NO II.21)

30 Cf. AL II.v.3; cf. end AL II.v.2; then AL II.xx.7.

31 Simple opposition to the ancients, or support for the 'moderns', or *visa versa*, is criticised by Bacon as one instance of an idol of the cave or den, at NO I.56.

32 AL II.xxii.2. Given Bacon's success as a founding advocate for modern reform in natural philosophy, it is perhaps unsurprising that work on his moral philosophy is itself a 'deficient' field: one small deficiency we are hoping to redress here. For a rare, very good, 'negative instance' to this rule, see Ian Box, 'Bacon's Moral Philosophy', in *Cambridge*

Pierre Hadot is probably the single figure who has done most to reanimate academic interest in the ancient Hellenistic and Roman sense of philosophy as a way of life, aiming at the cure of the passions and avoidable illusions, by advocating cognitive and extra-cognitive 'spiritual exercises' to achieve this therapeutic end.[33] In Hadot's wake, Soreana Corneanu has argued powerfully in her *Regimens of the Mind* that Bacon's method in natural philosophy, and his famous critiques of the 'idols', 'perturbations' and 'diseases' of the mind, are deeply indebted to ancient and medieval therapeutic traditions of philosophy.[34] This essay complements Corneanu's contribution by focusing on Bacon's conception of a therapeutic philosophical 'Georgics of the mind' in *The Advancement of Learning*, the *Essays*, and other Baconian texts. We aim to show firstly (in Part 2) how Bacon's conception of human nature, and the importance of habit and custom, reflects the ancient pagan thinkers' justifications of philosophical therapeutics. His advocacy of practical exercises centering around the memorization of salutary precepts, vows, and resolutions, we suggest, shows Bacon's surprising proximity to the Stoics in particular. Attention will also be paid in this connection to Bacon's sensitivity to another marker of ancient therapeutic philosophy as Hadot has presented it: the proliferation of different rhetorical and literary forms aiming at different pedagogic, therapeutic, and psychogogic aims.[35] Part 3 then will examine Bacon's renovations and changes in practical philosophy, carried out on the therapeutic ethical grounds which Part 2 has examined. As Bacon pursues notably in his

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*Companion to Bacon*, 260-282.

33 The *locus classicus* in English translation being Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, edited with an introduction by Arnold Davidson, translated by Michael Chase (London: Blackwell, 1996), especially 'Spiritual Exercises', pp. 81-125.

34 Soreana Corneanu, *Regimens of the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), esp. pp. 84-94. Pater Harrison has argued similarly, while underlining the Augustinian lineage of Bacon's *cultura animi*, in Harrison, 'Francis Bacon, Natural Philosophy, and the Cultivation of the Mind', esp. 144-150.

35 On the importance of literary forms in ancient philosophy, as reflecting the larger therapeutic and *paideiac* context, see especially Pierre Hadot, 'Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy,' in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 49-70.

sections on 'policy' and the 'architecture of fortune,' Bacon's ethical ideal is undoubtedly more 'active' than the contemplative or serene ideal he criticizes in the ancients; as it reflects his own particular biography as both '*politique*' and philosopher.[36]

**Part 2: Things Within Our Compass: Bacon's Georgics of the Mind**

In one sense, to find Bacon advocating for a practical, therapeutic ethics is not surprising. The philosophical Lord Chancellor is famously celebrated and lamented for challenging a purely contemplative conception of knowledge. In *Advancement of Learning* Book I Bacon openly proclaims his intent, in order to 'dignify and exalt knowledge', to see:

> … contemplation and action … more nearly and straightly conjoined and united together than they have been: a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the planet of rest and contemplation; and Jupiter, the planet of civil society and action… [37]

While Bacon, like Aristotle, hence divides the different branches of learning at first according to their objects—divine, natural, and human—he challenges Aristotle's segregation of practical from theoretical inquiry, with the former restricted to *ta politika* (political matters). Each part of philosophy, even physics, metaphysics, and natural history[38], has its operative as well as its speculative side. In natural philosophy, this is reflected in Bacon's revolutionary advocacy of experiments of fruit ('mechanical' physics; 'literate experience') and of light ('magical' metaphysics). Within each branch of knowledge, Bacon then divides kinds of inquiries according to the human faculties that

36 Bacon's key, striking autobiographical statement is found in the Proem to *Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature* or 1603.

37 AL I.v.11. Bacon's comparison here is Socrates' 'second sailing,' bring philosophy down from heavens to earth, by turning to moral and civic matters. Bacon wishes to also to bring natural philosophy down to earth, not by turning away from it, but by redirecting natural inquiry on the basis of detailed natural histories. On the relation between natural and civic-moral philosophy, see especially 'Orpheus', in *Wisdom of the Ancients*.

38 On natural history as divided between theoretical and experimental, see AL I.i.3; on physics as divided between theoretical and mechanical, AL I.vii.3-4; on metaphysics as likewise including a 'magical' side, expressing 'natural prudence', see AL I.vii.5-6.

predominate within them: histories, associated with memory and the recollection of particulars; rhetoric and poesie, with the imagination; and philosophy, which draws on the understanding, and aims to draw true general axioms from the labyrinthine matter of experience.[39]

Ethics or magistral philosophy, our specific concern, specifically involves the understanding insofar as it ministers—like Aristotle's deliberative reason (*logistikon*)[40]—to the human will and affections, with a view to action. Again as in Aristotle[41], ethics thus has a kind of 'architectonic' priority in Bacon's system. On the side of its objects, magistral philosophy alone directly considers the nature of the goods or ends at which all actions and inquiries aim. On the side of the inquiring subject, in Bacon its direct concerns with taming or redirecting the passions or affections also single out ethics as pedagogically decisive, in the following sense. The human mind is, or ought to be, as a mirror to nature, as the Greeks held and as Bacon argues on Solomonic, biblical authority.[42] Its reflected light, the understanding, is capable of accurately discerning the true forms of all things, the very alphabet with which the Creator has written the book of the world.[43] There can be no higher pleasure, Bacon can even echo Lucretius, than 'for the mind of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth.'[44] However, Bacon's famous doctrine of the idols of the mind[45]—or earlier, of its 'diseases' and 'peccant humors'[46]—reflects his astute diagnostic sense of the way that the 'dry light' of the understanding is all-too-readily discoloured by our passions, hopes and fears. 'If it be not delivered and reduced'[47] by philosophy and divinity, Bacon cautions:

39 AL II.i on division of knowledge by relevant human faculties.
40 Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book I, chapter 13; book VI, chapters 1-2, 5, 8-11.
41 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I.2.
42 AL I.i.4.
43 Cf. AL II.vi.5.
44 'Of Truth', *Essays*.
45 NO I.42-68.
46 AL I.iv and I.v.
47 AL I.xiv.9: here the mind is compared to an 'enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced.'

> … the human mind resembles those uneven mirrors which impart their own properties to different objects, from which rays are emitted and distort and disfigure them.[48]

The object of Bacon's philosophical therapeutics is, then, the passions, whose capacity to overpower our judgment affects both our best theoretical and practical endeavours. 'It may be fitly said,' Bacon claims, 'that the mind … would be temperate and stayed, if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation.'[49] The classical lineage of such a diagnosis is strongly defended by Pierre Hadot[50], including in his criticism of Michel Foucault's different focus in his work on the Greeks and Romans on the *aphrodisia* and *ēdonai* (the pleasures, rather than the passions).[51] Bacon for his part criticises Aristotle on the same ground, for taking the pleasures as the object of particular concern in the *Ethics*, since 'pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colors': equally present in them all, and so unable to yield insight into each's specific nature. [52] It follows directly from Bacon's classical diagnosis that, if we are interested in 'medicining the mind', we must come to accurately know 'the perturbations and distempers of the affections.'[53]

Aristotle did offer such a 'pathology' in his *Rhetoric*, Bacon concedes, albeit only 'collaterally … (as they may be moved by speech).'[54] The Stoics also devoted much time to understanding the *pathē* (passions),

48 *NO* I.41
49 AL II.xxi.5.
50 Cf. 'In the view of all philosophical schools, mankind's principal cause of suffering, disorder and unconsciousness were the passions: that is, unregulated desires and exaggerated fears. People are prevented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by the passions. Philosophy thus appears as a therapeutics of the passions …' *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 83.
51 Cf. Hadot, 'Reflections on the Idea of "Cultivation of the Self"' in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 206-214; esp. 206-7; and "Un Dialogue Interruptu Avec Michel Foucault": Convergences et Divergences,' in Pierre Hadot, *Exercises Spirituels et Philosohie Antique* Préface par Arnold Davidson (Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 2002), 313-321.
52 AL II.xxi.5.
53 AL II.xxi.5.
54 AL II.xxi.7.

Bacon concedes; and Bacon has some compliments to offer for their works on anger and consolations. Nevertheless, it is deeply significant (if contentious) that Bacon also criticizes the Stoics *per se* for addressing the passions 'rather in subtlety of definitions … than in active and ample descriptions and observations.'[55] The best school for learning about the passions, Bacon rather argues—in a way which in contemporary times evokes similar arguments by Martha Nussbaum[56]—is that of the poets and historians:

> … the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves; how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify: how they are enwrapped one within another; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other like particularities.[57]

So, here again, Bacon corroborates a second key feature of ancient philosophy as (firstly) a therapy of the passions, recognized in recent scholarly literature on this subject. This is that, to the extent that philosophy conceives her role as extending beyond adducing pure *theoria* to try to speak to, form, and transform subjects and their passions, it is incumbent upon her practitioners to command a much wider range of literary forms than contemporary academic philosophy sanctions.[58] In Bacon's system, this is a question of the 'transmission' of knowledge or 'tradition'. And for Bacon, in sharpest contrast to images of him as the advocate of monotone 'scientific' *reportage*,[59] what and

55 AL II.xxi.6.

56 Martha Nussbaum, 'Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature', in *Love's Knowledge* (Oxford Uni Press: New York, Oxford, 1990), esp. pp. 26-7, 36-49.

57 AL II.xxi.6.

58 Cf. for example Hadot, 'Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Thought', in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*; in Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

59 This image can be drawn from abstracting what Bacon has to say concerning the compiling of natural histories alone, and retrospectively reading subsequent developments in scientific modes of writing back on to him. Cf. the *Parasceve's* injunctions, in writing such histories which should collect all relevant data on some subject, to: 'let antiquities be done

how we teach should be varied according to the inquirers' objects and aims, and the ends and capabilities of the audience.[60] The 'magisterial' or direct transmission of completed knowledge, which our journal articles and monographs enshrine as *the* philosophical form of communication is, for Bacon, but one possible mode of such 'tradition'. Distinguished from initiative, aphoristic, 'enigmatical' ('acroamatic'), and pictorial modes of transmitting knowledge, it is also criticized by him for encouraging admiration and commentary from audiences, rather than *emulation* and (so) the advancement of new learning.[61] Denotative theoretical discourses concerning the passions and their therapeutic direction, Bacon rebuffs his Stoics, by themselves amount 'in a subject of this nature' to little more than 'curiosities'.[62] Aristotle again had noted something like this in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when he stresses that ethics' goal is action; and that merely reading a theoretical treatise on these subjects will not, by itself, make anyone better.[63] In Bacon's more purple prose, a purely theoretical description of the passions or the good life, however fine, 'seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion…'[64]



away with, works, citations, assents of authors, altercations and disputations—all philological matters…' (paragraph 1); 'All eloquences [are] likewise to be cast aside.' (paragraph 2) Francis Bacon, *Parasceve* in *The Works of Francis Bacon Volume VII* collected and edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis & Douglas Denon Heath (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, c. 1900), 357-371; at 357-358. Such natural history is but one, the least philosophical, part of Baconian natural philosophy, which is in its turn one branch of (divine, human, and natural) learning. The *Novum Organum* and, indeed, nearly every work Bacon penned would stand accused, if all eloquences were 'to be cast aside' in philosophical conveyances.

60 Cf. also AL II.xviii.5, on rhetoric's power to respond to different auditors.

61 AL II.xvii.3-4.

62 AL II.xxi.6. It is not our concern here to contest the accuracy of Bacon's depictions of the particular ancient schools. Although he notes and cites Seneca's poetry and letters, Bacon still does not write as though the Stoics offered psychologically sensitive philosophical therapy, or as if his image of the Stoics remains bound to the Hellenistic fragments which at that time becoming widely available in Europe.

63 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.2; II.4 end; X.9.

64 AL II.xxii.1

The only way philosophy could be able to move the passions therapeutically, Bacon argues—this being a third notable feature of his position—is if it takes upon itself the charge of *rehabituating* individuals' characteristic ways of thinking and acting. And this, as we will see, will require the philosopher's mastery of a variety of different literary forms, and the students' willingness to apply what (and how) they read to their own lives and passions. Bacon's essays 'Of Custom' and 'Of Nature' are of thus one voice in emphasising that while '[f]orce maketh nature more violent in the return; doctrine and discourse maketh nature less importune; … [it is] *custom [or habit] only doth alter and subdue nature*.'[65] The passions certainly have a cognitive content for Bacon (so anger, for instance, always involves the belief that one has suffered an unjust offence or contempt of reputation[66]). Yet their power over our psyches cannot be removed simply by 'the better argument,' read or heard once, in isolation from the trials and demands of our practical lives. We certainly should not 'wonder to hear men profess, protest, engage, give great words, and then do just as they have done before…': for Bacon, as for Aristotle, such *akrasia* is a prominent feature of ethical life.[67] Nevertheless, Bacon characteristically rebukes Aristotle for taking such sound psychological observations as license for a deeply unsound conclusion; in this case the idea that the impress of habits formed early in life is so deep upon people's characters that we can scarcely hope to change them later on through philosophical therapy:

> The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better.[68]

65 'Of Nature', opening lines. Cf. also 'Of Regiment of Health', in *Essays*.
66 Cf. Bacon, 'Of Anger', in *Essays*.
67 'Of Custom', in *Essays*.
68 AL II.xxi.8. See Bacon's '… so of all living creatures, the perfectest (Man) is the most susceptible of help, improvement, impressin and alteration. And not only in his body, but in his mind and spirit. And there again not only in his appetite and affections, but in his

The passions which motivate our actions are set very deep in our nature, Bacon agrees.[69] But this does not mean that the customary modes of perceiving and acting they enshrine are unchangeable. To compare the capacities of the human soul to change with those a thrown stone seems to Bacon a false, and falsely pessimistic, image. The situation of the soul, and the relative malleability of its passions and habits, is one wherein 'nature' is not 'peremptory', but has allowed scope for change. The human character is thus better compared to a straight glove, which molds to the hand through repeated wear; just as 'a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew.'[70] Likewise, Bacon notes, we can and do train the voice to speak louder, or accustom ourselves through trial to bear unwonted extremes of temperature. These and comparable instances of physiological training, Bacon contends, surely 'have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners [Aristotle] handleth, than those instances which he allegeth.'[71] '[A]llowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in habit,' Bacon thus charges, Aristotle 'ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing' new habits in individual's minds.[72]

Bacon's Georgics of the mind *aims* exactly then at 'superinducing'[73] new, beneficent habits or 'customs' in the psyche.[74] And the *means* for

power of wit and reason.' Cited at Gaukroger, *Francis Bacon and the Transformation*, 12.

69 Indeed, in Bacon's structuring of the chapters on the 'culture and cure of the mind' (AL II.xxii.3), the passions, and their study, fall within the realm of things 'without our control': as a 'point of nature'. (II.xxii.3; II.xxii.6)

70 AL II.xxi.8.

71 AL II.xxi.8. We note again the classical antecedence of the parallel between training the mind and training the body, which hearkens back at least to Socrates' propensity to raise questions concerning the care and education of youth, by 'analogies' with gymnastic training, or the training of domestic animals.

72 Aristotle's conclusion that for those who have not had a good start in life, ethical training will be useless Bacon rejects, as the Hellenistic thinkers had also done. It is more difficult, but still possible, for older dogs to learn new tricks. AL II.xxi.8. Aristotle, NE I.3; I.4; II.1.

73 'Super-inducing' of new forms upon given matter is a key motif and ideal in Bacon's natural philosophy, a hoped-for corollary of true knowledge of natural forms: cf. NO II.5.

74 That Aristotle, as Bacon charges, did not descend to this more humble, but efficacious, form of ethical inquiry reflects his wider critique of the Stagirite (and the Greeks more

this 'cure of men's minds' which Bacon adjudges sadly neglected amongst the ancients, nevertheless resemble remarkably those which Pierre Hadot, again, has advertised as key markers of ancient, therapeutic philosophy. We mean Hadot's notion of 'spiritual exercises': exercises of memorization, meditation, recollection, imaginative rehearsal, reading and writing to be repeated by students; all of which aimed to render the principles of the different ancient schools 'able to penetrate to the depths of one's being, so that [they are] not believed only for a brief moment, hut become an unshakable conviction, … always "ready," "at hand," "present to mind," … a "habitus of the soul."'[75] Under the header of things within our control that philosophy (coupled with religious faith) can directly change, Bacon for his part lists some 16 'medicines' for the mind which he contends philosophers have not adequately prescribed or dispensed. These are custom; exercise; habit; education; example; imitation; emulation; company; friendship; praise;



widely) of neglecting the hard, but sometimes menial, work of gathering and accounting for particulars. The cause of this philosophical neglect—for which Bacon will of course offer his own *novum organum* as the cure in natural philosophy—lay in a kind of intellectual pride and laziness: one which, rooted deep in our nature or 'tribe', leaps to the more satisfying, and less labor intensive, contemplation of imagined axiomata ('anticipations of experience'), rather than venture the longer art of inducing true principles from experience. To cite only one example, AL I.iv.7 thus depicts the medieval followers of Aristotle thus: '… as in the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of God's word, and to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left the oracle of God's works, and adored the deceiving and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few received authors or principles, did represent unto them…' For Bacon, by contrast, 'that which is deserving of existence is deserving of knowledge, the image of existence', and 'the sun enters alike the palace and the privy'. (NO I.120) A practical, therapeutic ethics may be as a poor handmaiden to the work of divine preaching, or—differently—the elevating visions of the Good which the philosophers have offered us. Yet: '… moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, "That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress' will …' (AL II.xxii.1)

75 Hadot, at Davidson 'Introduction: Pierre Hadot and the Spiritual Phenomenon of Ancient Philosophy', in Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 22-23. Hadot's fullest systematic treatment of the spiritual exercises comes in Hadot, 'Spiritual Exercises', in *Philosophy as a Way of Life*.

reproof; exhortation; fame [reputation]; laws; books; and studies.[76] From these means, Bacon claims—far beyond edifying argumentation alone—'are such receipts and regiments compounded and described as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to human medicine.'[77]

Decisive for us here—recalling our promissory comments above concerning the need for the philosophical therapist to be open to a variety of literary media to affect subjects' passions and habits—is the key role Bacon assigns in his Georgics to the collection and memorization of *short, striking precepts and apothegms*. Under the heading of 'exercises of the mind,' Bacon for instance gives us four such precepts 'of the wise' for rectifying bad habits. These are not to be admired as self-standing products of a pleasing theoretical achievement, but the prescriptive conclusions of larger philosophical reflections, to be memorized and repeatedly applied:[78]

i. 'beware we take not at the first either too high a strain [risking

76 II.xii.7. The reader of Bacon's *Essays* will recognize in this list several of that volume's particular titles (Of Friendship; Of Custom; Of Studies; Of Praise; Of Fame), and many more of those essays' specific concerns. Bacon's *Essays* can be read with great profit as illustrative of many of the principles Bacon recommends in the chapters on 'magistral philosophy' from the *Advancement*. See on the *Essays*' relation to Bacon's larger program Ronald B. Crane, 'The Relation of Bacon's *Essays* to the Program of the Advancement of Learning,' in *Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968), 272-292.

77 AL II.xii.7. cf. 'Of Regiment of Health', in *Essays*, where the parallel between 'physic' and rehabituating the mind is central.

78 Hadot has argued in, *The Inner Citadel* (USA: Harvard University Press, 1998) that many of the fragments in Marcus' *Meditations* represent *kephalaia*, 'chapter headings' which aphoristically state the practically decisive conclusions of larger Stoic chains of reasoning, which the Emperor writes down in varying, sometimes striking phrases, in his effort to internalise them. Examples include variations on the dogmata that: Pleasure and pain are not true goods or evils (*Meds.* IV.3.6; XII.8); That the only shameful thing is ethical failure (*Meds.* II.1.3); That harms committed against us cannot harm us (*Meds.* II.1.3; XII.26);That he who commits the harm hurts only himself (*Meds.* IV.26.3); That harm cannot only be found in oneself (*Meds.* VII.29.7; XII.26); That I cannot suffer harm from another, unless I consent in judgment that this is harm. (*Meds.* II.1.3; VII.22.2) Bacon's four precepts here (and he mentions the need for many more) seem to us exactly of the same kind.

rapid initial change followed by an equally speedy relapse] or too weak [risking making no change at all]' when we wish to introduce the new habit[79];

ii. 'to practice all things chiefly at two several times, the one when the mind is best disposed [to "make great leaps"], the other when it is worst disposed [to "work out the knots and stonds of the mind"]'[80];

iii. Aristotle's sole, directly practical prescription in the *Nicomachean Ethics* '… to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the rowing against the stream …', etc.[81];

iv. that 'the mind is brought to anything better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but *tanquam aliud agendo*, because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint …'[82]

In the same vein, it is notable how those of Bacon's *Essays* given over to the passions (anger, suspicion, ambition, fear, vainglory) which *Advancement* names as the decisive stuff of ethics, turn around the articulation of clipped, memorable generalisations ('It was a high speech of Seneca … that the good things, which belong to prosperity, are to be wished; but the good things, that belong to adversity, are to be admired'[83]). These are then illustrated (and qualified) principally by way of examples in the body of each essay.[84] Bacon was himself the author of

79 AL II.xxii.9.
80 AL II.xxii.10.
81 AL II.xxii.11.
82 AL II.xxii.13. Likewise, when Bacon comes to advice concerning what he calls the 'architecture of fortune,' to which we will return in Part 3, he again lists 24 brief, 'eagle'-like precepts from his own hero and object of emulation, the Biblical Solomon, as the needed means to ethical transformation.
83 'Of Adversity,' in *Essays* opening.
84 Compare on this Lisa Jardine, 'The Method of Bacon's Essays', in *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse*, 227-248. See 'Of Deformity' in *Essays* for an example of

collections of memorable 'Apophthegms', *'Ornamenta Rationalia' or 'Elegant Sentences';* a *Promus* of striking phrases across several languages, and a compilation of 'Colours,' short cogent statements in which goods and evils may be presented with persuasive rhetorical effect.[85] He explicitly praises aphoristic presentations of philosophical claims for the subjective *work* they invite in audiences, to draw out unstated connections and exemplary illustrations, or call forth counter-exempla.[86] Again, when Bacon comes to that particular 'culture of the mind' whose goal it is 'to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate and take forth the evil,' he recommends that the former can only be done through 'vows or constant resolutions, and observances or exercises'; as the latter requires 'some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an inception or account *de novo*' which verge into what is 'sacred and religious.'[87]

The key for us here is that Bacon's philosophical therapy calls upon much more than the instruments of reasoning alone. Just as Hadot has argued concerning the ancient philosophical schools' spiritual exercises, Bacon's philosophical therapeutics *philosophically prescribe the 'magistral' use of all the resources of the agent's will, resolution, and memory*. Then there are also the powers of rhetoric to form strikingly memorable, incisive precepts, and imagination to call vividly to mind the good and bad consequences of present impulses, in order to rectify our impulses under conditions of temptation.[88] Not somehow an abrogation of philosophical

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how Bacon will cite examples both for, then against, the ethical precepts he recommends: reflecting his recognition that ethics, being so 'mired in matter', does not admit of readily universal precepts.

85 See *Bacon's Essays, including his Moral and Historical Works, namely The Essays, The Colours of Good and Evil; Ornamenta Rationalia, or Elegant Sentences; Short Notes for Civil Conversation; Advancement of Learning; Wisdom of the Ancients; New Atlantis; Apophthegms; History of Henry VII, … VIII, … Elizabeth, with Memoir, Notes and Glossary* (London: Frederick Warned and co., 1911). In his Dedication 'to the Lord Montjove', Bacon cheekily presents the *Colours* as the completion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 'as I am glad to the part of a good house-hen, which without any strangeness may sit upon a pheasant's eggs', etc. (at *Bacon's Essays etc.*, 117).

86 AL II.xvii.6-7.

87 II.xxii.14.

88 II.xviii.4 As Bacon writes, one great power of rhetoric and imagination, alongside

rigor or intention, this advocacy of what we today take to be extra-philosophical means *reflects* Bacon's considered *theoretical* assessment of human nature, the passions, and the shaping force of custom. 'If the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason,' Bacon reflects in his earlier defense of rhetoric as vital to ethics, 'it would be true there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs.' But this is simply false. We are passionate creatures, whose impassioned pursuits of particular, immediate goods all-too-easily cause us to lose sight of our larger ends and ideals. A truly therapeutic philosophy, Bacon thus contends, must see reason bending to the imagination, so that the passions can be magistrally redirected:

> … in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections—'*Video meliora, proboque, Deteriora sequor*' [I see and approve of the better, but I follow the worse]—reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practice and win the imagination from the affections' part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth …[89]

## Part 3: From Georgics of the Mind to an Architecture of Fortune: Bacon's Augmentation of the Ancients

So far, we have seen that Bacon's conception of a Georgics of the mind, answers closely to the decisive features of ancient therapeutic

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memory, is to make the absent present to mind, when present demands and passions threaten to blind us: 'The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth.' Compare Hadot: 'What's interesting about the idea of spiritual exercises is precisely that it is not a matter of a purely rational consideration, but the putting in action of all kinds of means, intended to act upon one's self. Imagination and affectivity play a capital role here: we must represent to ourselves in vivid colors the dangers of such-and-such a passion, and use striking formulations of ideas in order to exhort ourselves. We must also create habits, and fortify ourselves by preparing ourselves against hardships in advance.' Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 284.

89 AL II.xvii.1.

philosophy, as it has been analysed particularly by Pierre Hadot. Bacon's argument is that such a therapeutic ethics needs to (i) diagnostically comprehend the passions, (ii) curatively target and change individuals' deep-set habits and customs, by (iii) prescribing exercises drawing on the individual's faculties of will, imagination, and memory, requiring (iv) that the philosophical therapist (and her charge) deploy a variety of literary forms, including precepts and apophthegms. All of these features suggest that Bacon represents an exception to Hadot's historical claim that the ancient idea of philosophy as an existential, therapeutic endeavour largely disappeared in the modern world.[90] Nevertheless, the picture of Bacon as we have presented it so far does not seem wholly right. Bacon was celebrated in his time, and has remained renowned or reviled as a founder of distinctly modern modes of philosophy, and the leading prophet of what was to become the scientific revolution. In fact, beyond correcting what he perceives to be the ancients' proud neglect of the therapeutic means needed to ascend the 'platform of the Good', Bacon's 'magistral' philosophy significantly challenges some of the key substantive commitments of ancient pagan philosophical ethics. It is to this challenge that we now turn.

'[T]he electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends', Bacon tells us, is the 'most compendious and summary' means for a person to 'mold themselves to virtue.'[91] Bacon however strongly disagrees with the ancient, Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the highest good as enshrining the prolonged, private contemplation of the highest, unchangeable truths:[92] 'this doctrine of the philosopher's

90 Hadot makes this grand historical claim, admittedly with qualifications and exceptions, in Pierre Hadot, *What is Ancient Philosophy?* translated by Michael Chase (USA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 239-261.

91 AL II.xxii.15.

92 The *locus classicus* for what Bacon seems to mean is Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* book X.7, although he cites Seneca's famous 'to have the security of a god, and the fragility of a man' as illustrating 'the height of style' Bacon here opposes. It is thus notable that, in certain other passages, Bacon qualifies his opposition to this ancient idea, under the heading of 'passive,' 'perfective' good, wherein we are told that man's 'approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form,' albeit that 'the error

heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man's nature than was …'[93] In *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon draws the principal reason speaking against this 'philosopher's heaven' from one of the 'unapprehended relations between things'[94] Bacon thought *prima philosophia*, properly conceived, should uncover. In all things, Bacon claims, we can observe a kind of 'double nature': the one, touching each thing's own specific good, considered as a separate, more or less self-sufficient thing; and the other, affecting each thing as but 'a part or member of a greater body.'[95] Iron, in small enough quantities, is irresistibly drawn to loadstone; but, beyond a certain size, it 'forsaketh the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth.'[96] Just so in morals, Bacon argues, '[t]his double nature of good', individual and 'public,' is 'engraven upon man.'[97] It speaks, powerfully, in his eyes to the superiority of a post-Christian conception of the highest good as being a 'public' thing; aiming beyond the *beatitude* of the single individual, towards the *charitas* of the individual towards others, as one member of their larger communities.[98] 'I take goodness in this sense,' Bacon's 'Of Goodness and Goodness in Nature' begins:

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or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life…' AL II.xxi.2. See also the ambiguous 'heathen and profane' passages from Aristotle and Pliny the Second concerning Trajan, at AL II.xxii.15.

93 AL II.xx.4.

94 The quote comes from Shelley, *The Defence of Poetry* (in *English Essays: Sidney to Macaulay. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14* (available online at www-site http://www.bartleby.com/27/23.html last accessed August 2013), describing Bacon's *prima philosophia*. Shelley famously claimed that Bacon's wide-ranging intelligence was deeply poetic in kind. 'These similitudes or relations' from which poets spin their metaphors, Shelley writes, 'are finely said by Lord Bacon to be "the same footsteps of nature impressed upon the various subjects of the world"—and he considers the faculty which perceives them as the storehouse of axioms common to all knowledge [*prima philosophia*] …' Bacon claimed that inquiry into these 'common footsteps of nature' or 'common adjuncts of things' was deficient, but could serve 'both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art…' AL II.v.3; cf. end II.v.2

95 II.xx.7.

96 II.xx.7.

97 II.xx.7.

98 Consider the opening of 'Wisdom for a Man's Self': 'An ant is a wise creature for itself, but it is a shrewd thing, in an orchard or garden. And certainly, men that are great lovers of themselves, waste the public. Divide with reason; between self-love and society; and be so

> [it is] the affecting of the weal of men, … that the Grecians call *philanthropia*; and the word humanity … is a little too light to express it. … This of all virtues and dignities of the mind is the greatest; being the character of the Deity: and without it, man is a busy, mischievous, wretched thing … Goodness answers to the theological virtue, charity, and admits no excess, but error.[99]

Persistent readings of Bacon as an atheist have to contend[100] with his repeated paeans to charity. *Charitas* for Bacon is both that highest virtue which binds and complete the virtues (as in Aquinas),[101] and that shaping corrective which safeguards the pursuit of knowledge, including in natural philosophy, from promoting mere 'swelling' or 'ostentation' in knowers.[102] Images of Bacon as enshrining power over nature for its own sake have to contend, likewise, with his frequent advertisements of the new sciences as motivated by the same 'charity for man and anxiety to



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true to thyself, as thou be not false to others… It is a poor centre of a man's actions, himself. It is right earth. For that only stands fast upon his own centre; whereas all things, that have affinity with the heavens, move upon the centre of another, which they benefit …'

99 'Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature', *Essays*.

100 See esp. AL I.i.3, and 'Of Atheism', in the *Essays*, noting the distinction between superstition and atheism in 'Of Superstition'. The idea of Bacon as an atheist is widely held, and shared amongst scholars influenced by Leo Strauss. These authors treat Bacon's many disavowals of atheism, his prayers, the *Sacra Meditatio*, etc. and contrary testimony of Bacon's executor and chaplain Rawley, as merely 'exoteric': Lawrence Lampert, *Nietzsche and Modern Times* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1995); Howard B. White, *Peace Amongst the Willows* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), and Svetozar Minkov, *Francis Bacon's Inquiry Touching Human Nature: Virtue, Philosophy, and the Relief of Man's Estate* (Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2010). Bacon's Christian context and antecedents, by contrast, are strongly stressed by Peter Harrison, *The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007); Peter Harrison, 'Francis Bacon, Natural Philosophy, and the Cultivation of the Mind', *Perspectives on Science* 2012, vol. 20, no. 2, 139-158; Benjamin Farrington, *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), esp. 21-26, 30-31; Steven Matthews, *Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon* (London: Ashgate, 2008); Jeffrey Cordell, 'Baconian Apologetics: Knowledge and Charity in *The Advancement of Learning*,' *Studies in Philology*, Volume 108, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp. 86-107. Bacon's utopian vision in *The New Atlantis* is clearly not a-religious, as we see from the mysterious 'feast of the family,' although it is also distant from established forms of Christian worship, gesturing rather towards hermeticism—on which, cf. White, *Peace Among the Willows*, 167-189.

101 AL II.xii.15.

102 AL I.i.3.

relieve his sorrows and necessities': an end which speaks to the need for philosophy, through 'experiments of fruit,' to produce practical benefits for non-philosophers.[103]

In any case, in *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon takes this sovereign good of charity, not serenity or theoretical wisdom, to 'judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant.' [104] Indeed, it is plausible to claim that accepting this changed *summum bonum* shapes all of Bacon's more particular differences with Hellenic and Roman ethicists.[105] '[T]he conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being,' Bacon argues.[106] First of all, it 'decides … against Aristotle' the issue of whether an active or a contemplative life is superior. 'Men must know, that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers-on,' Bacon comments.[107] The Stoics, because of their valuation of virtuous practical action, here as elsewhere score highest in Bacon's eyes amongst the ancient schools. But Bacon sternly censures the Epicurean valuation of pleasure as the highest good, even in Lucretius' more contemplative parsing of the same,[108] as 'manifest to tend to private repose and contentment, and not to point of society.'[109]

Ancient philosophical therapeutics more widely, Bacon complains, was too 'passive' and 'private' in its prescriptions and its cures. He worries especially that in seeking serenity, the ancient philosophers too



103 'Preface' to 'Natural and Experimental History' being *Great Instauration* Part III.
104 AL II.xx.8.
105 Although we cannot pursue this here, Bacon in this light is comfortable speaking the near-legalistic language of duty, to compliment the classical virtues. Cf. AL II.xxi.6.
106 AL II.xx.7. Although we cannot pursue this here, Bacon in this light (and as here) is comfortable speaking the near-legalistic language of duty to compliment the classical virtues, in a way that some contemporary 'virtue ethicists' have strongly challenged, and which places him closest once more to the Stoics amongst the ancients. Cf. AL II.xxi.6-11, Bacon's call for vocation-specific ethics, and 'Of Marriage', 'Of Parents', 'Of Suitors', 'Of Judicature', for examples in *Essays*.
107 AL II.xx.8.
108 Which Bacon had himself drawn from in 'Of Truth', in *Essays*.
109 AL II.xx.9.

readily jeopardised true magnanimity,[110] in many cases 'retiring too easily from civil business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations.'[111] Provocatively, he suggests that we should not simply decide against the Callicles of the *Gorgias* in favour of Socrates, whose 'virtue has more use in ceasing perturbations than in compassing desires.'[112] He repeats in different places his sense that the Stoic attempt to eradicate the *pathē* (passions) was excessive and misguided.[113] Bacon echoes Montaigne's later criticism that Stoic exercises in premeditating death may serve paradoxically to make it a more, rather than less fearful thing.[114] '[E]ven as we used to hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise perchance we could not so easily recover,' Bacon analogises, so too philosophical therapy should learn the arts of 'setting affection against affection, … to master one by another,' rather than dreaming of their entire cessation.[115] The ancient philosophers sought to 'make men's minds too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions', Bacon charges: an intrapsychic reflection of their wider temerity before the ardors of public business.[116] Epictetus in particular is singled out for criticism concerning his key practical distinction between things within and beyond our control, insofar as in Epictetus, this distinction:

> … presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance; as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune.[117]

Bacon himself draws on Epictetus' distinction, when he is setting out the different fields to which his Georgics will apply. Like a neoStoics',

110 AL II.xxi.5 end.
111 AL II.xx.12; cf. 'On Narcissus' in *Wisdom of the Ancients*.
112 II.xxi.4.
113 'Of Anger' start.
114 'Of Death'; AL II.xxi.5. cf. Michel de Montaigne, 'III.iv. Of Diversion', in his *Essays*.
115 AL II.xxii.6.
116 AL II.xxi.5.
117 AL II.xx.10.

Bacon's 'Georgics' are divided between measures concerning things within our power (the subjects of 'alteration'), and beyond it (the objects of 'application').[118] But his immediately ensuing description of the goal which both kinds of ethical measure should aim at expresses well his different, more 'active' sense of what real ethical improvement should strive towards: *viz.* 'a wise and industrious suffering, which contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary.'[119] This is an explicitly more 'expansive' sense of ethics than that of the Hellenistic schools, in particular. Bacon indeed appeals to a natural desire in all creatures to 'dilate and multiply' themselves, reflected in the greater yield of pleasure nature bestows upon sexual over other activities. In humans, this desire is seen in the spontaneous pleasure Bacon suggests all people take in 'variety and proceeding' amongst entertainments, and differently in the desire people feel to impress their 'signature' upon affairs and in public estimation.[120]

We can highlight the contrast between Bacon and the Stoics—as representative of the ancient therapeutic schools—by considering the following. The Stoics typically express grave caution about peoples' propensity to make themselves miserable by worrying about others' opinions, since these are beyond our individual control.[121] In the context of laying out his 'Georgics', by contrast, Bacon declares the need for philosophy to *more systematically* concern itself with, analyze and

118 AL II.xxii.3.

119 AL II.xxii.3. Cf. 'Of Adversity', in *Essays*. To put adverse fortune to personal, spiritual development is a key Stoic idea, but the recourse to 'use' and 'advantage' here, in context, reflect Bacon's more expansive, publically-directed, sense of the good life.

120 AL II.xxi.1-2. Such a desire, we note, was considered meaningfully empty or false by both Epicureans and Stoics.

121 Cf. for a paradigmatic example Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 'Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.' II.8; or for a kind of summary of Stoic exercises to deal with vexation by others *loc cit.* XI.18. We note that Marcus for one also asks us to calmly consider others' motives as a means to soften such anxieties in Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* IX.18: 'Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves …'

catalogue the different kinds of dispositions we come across in the course of our practical lives: minds 'proportioned' to larger or smaller matters; to one task at a time, or better able to 'multi-task'; to shorter- or longer-term projects; to cross or to please in conversation; or to take pleasure or pain in the fortunes of others.[122] Likewise, Bacon calls for close study of whether meaningful generalizations can be drawn concerning the effects of different 'impressions of nature'—sex, age, region, health or sickness, beauty or deformity[123]—upon people; as well as of the effects of different 'points of fortune': sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant or variable fortune, rapid or slower political rise or fall …[124] It is little wonder, given this greater attentiveness to the varieties of concrete experience Bacon advocates for, that in the context of defending these new studies of passions, dispositions, and points of fortune in a truly therapeutic ethics, that we see him prescribing the study of literature and histories as schools of ethical insight. It is specifically 'history [that] makes men wise', we are told in 'Of Studies,' whereas morals by themselves only make men grave.[125] *Advancement of Learning* explains that this is because, in concerns so 'immersed in matter'[126] and particulars as practical life is, discerning judgment can only be developed by attending to 'knowledge drawn freshly … out of particulars' and examples: 'imitation [being] a globe of precepts.'[127] Again, then, we see how much Bacon anticipates Martha Nussbaum's argument in *Love's Knowledge* and elsewhere for the

122 AL II.xxi.4.
123 AL II.xxi.5; cf. 'Of Beauty' and 'Of Deformity' in *Essays*.
124 AL II.xxi.5; cf. 'Of Adversity', 'Of Riches', 'Of Great Place', 'Of Nobility', 'Of Marriage', 'Of Parents', 'Of Fortune', 'Of Honour and Reputation', 'Of Judicature', in *Essays*.
125 'Of Studies', in *Essays*.
126 AL II.xxiii.1. The proximity to Aristotelian conceptions of the different levels of precision available for different object domains is again clear here. Matters of practical ethics for Bacon also are 'most immersed in matter and hardliest reduced to axiom.' We are a long way for later scientistic (or economistic) dreams of meaningfully mathematizing practical life, or otherwise reducing humanistic knowledge.
127 'Of Great Place', in *Essays*. Again, Bacon here reflects Aristotelian ideas concerning the key role of *mimesis* in learning, cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* II.1-2.

wisdom of teaching virtue ethics through literary examples. In Bacon's words concerning history, which closely echo Nussbaum's concerning the novels of Henry James, Proust, and others:

> … it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.[128]

Bacon's most remarkable departure from the philosophical ancients, which shows most clearly the compass of his more publically-spirited *vita activa*, comes in his delineation in chapter xxiii of book II of *Advancement* of an 'architecture of fortune.'[129] This neglected subject forms part of those knowledges concerning 'man aggregate,' considered as a member of the social whole. Alongside the 'wisdoms' of 'conversation', and of 'negotiation or business' more widely, it speaks to peoples' interests in social concourse to secure 'comfort, use, and protection.'[130] It more specifically concerns the kind of practical *savoir-faire* a man interested in political elevation might draw on to 'press his own fortune,' amidst the ardors of 'business' and 'negotiation,' and the intrigues of ambitious men.[131] The very thought that a man might make his own luck or press his fortune challenges the Stoics' categories, and calls to mind Machiavelli's famous closing claims in *The Prince* concerning the possibility of conquering *fortuna*.[132] None of the ancient philosophers

128 AL II.xxiii.8. Compare Martha Nussbaum, 'Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature', in *Love's Knowledge* (Oxford Uni Press: New York, Oxford, 1990), esp. pp. 26-7, 36-49; 'An Aristotelian Conception of Rationality', in the same volume, esp. pp. 66-84; also 'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination' again in *Love's Knowledge*, esp. pp. 165-7.

129 AL II.xxiii.13.

130 AL xxiii.2.

131 AL II.xxii.10

132 AL II.xxiii.10; Machiavelli, *The Prince*, xxvi (closing chapter). Bacon several times stresses that it is best that great success be attributed to fortune, to allay the envy of others,

after Socrates speak, except critically, of pursuing external goods like political station independently of the goods of the soul. Indeed, we may well surmise that in these sections, Bacon the philosopher-statesman hopes to lay out a truly 'realistic' ethics for public life, decisively challenging the pertinence of Socratic ethics for the *politique*: and answering his own earlier lament that 'the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio's argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and dotage …'[133]

Certainly nothing in Bacon's sections on the architecture of fortune is idle, or idealized. Bacon begins and ends[134] this part of the text by protesting that, however these 'good arts' teaching men 'how to rise and make their fortune'[135] will be looked upon with suspicion, and their precepts seem to approximate to mere 'cunning',[136] this architecture of fortune has legitimacy and need.[137] Its end, Bacon reassures us, is not

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and not tempt fate: contrasting Pompei *'Magnus'*'s fate with that of Sulla *'Felix'*. See 'Of Envy' in *Essays*. Bacon's proximity to Machiavelli is a point of emphasis in White, *Peace among the Willows* (esp. pp. 37-39, 72-75, 125-7), and in other 'Straussian' treatments of Bacon, 'modernity' in large being, for this sect, saliently and deleteriously predetermined by Machiavelli's premises. See Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

133 AL II.xxi.7. The context is Bacon's calling for considerations of the specific ethical duties of different vocations, given how much of our ethical lives are taken up occupying different social stations. It is notable that several of the *Essays* are clearly addressed either to *politiques* or, indeed, to rulers or sovereigns. Cf. esp. 'Of Simulation & Dissimulation'; 'Of Great Place'; 'Of Boldness'; 'Of Nobility'; 'Of Ambition'; 'Of Suitors'; 'Of Followers and Friends'.

134 Cf. AL II.xiii.10. Aware of the potentially controversial nature of the very idea that a person should be spurred, or aided, to make their own fortune, Bacon hastens to claim ancient sanction for it in revered apothegms and ancient examples: notably drawn from Plautus, a poet, and the historian Livy, rather than any of the philosophers.

135 AL II.xxiii.13.

136 See also 'Of Cunning', in *Essays*.

137 There is need for good men to know enough of how wickedness works that it can be combatted, one more reason why realistic historical studies are salutary matter for study, and why Bacon praises Machiavelli's method, not his conclusions. (AL II.xxi.9; cf. AL II.iii.4; II.v.4; II.xxii.13; II.xxiii.8-9). 'The Italians have an ungracious proverb, *Tanto buon che val niente*: so good, that he is good for nothing,' Bacon tells us, with seeming approval in 'Of Goodness and Goodness for a Man's Self.' We should also be able to answer

serpentine wisdom for its own sake; but to enable students 'to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us, and to conduct them with less error and … more dexterity.'[138] Bacon's ensuing portrait of the '*politique*'[139] extols a man meticulously self-aware in his choices of friends, vocations, projects, exemplars; about when and how to show ostentation, about the brevity of fames, how to conceal his defects, when to bend to the occasion, to disclose or conceal information, and how always to have 'a window to fly out' of any venture he undertakes.[140] While Bacon accepts the impossibility of exact knowledge concerning others and their motives, his *politique* will nevertheless be in command of 'Momius' window': the arts of *how to learn* concerning different kinds of peoples'[141] natures, desires, ends, customs, fashions, helps, strengths, weaknesses, friends, enemies, moods, times, principles, observations and actions.[142] An attentive reader (where time permits) of histories and the epistles of exemplary statesmen touching their public lives[143], this Baconian *politique* will be slow to assent, trust words spoken more in surprise or emotion than otherwise, credit countenance over words generally, and weigh the testimony of deeds over both countenances and words.[144] He will cultivate acquaintances with different kinds of men, prudently balancing openness and secrecy with each.[145] Above all, he will turn all things to his note and to his advantage, even his own errors and defeats. Indeed, in the sheer inner intensity of this figure pressing *fortuna* as far as she will yield, we see the ancients' call to

'pragmatical men' who assert that all learning is but a 'lark that can mount and sing, and please herself,' but never descend, like the hawk, to matters of business. (AL II.xxiii.10-13; II.xxiii.43; cf. AL I.ii in general, Bacon's 'answer to *politiques*, which in their humorous severity, or in their feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations upon learning.')

138 AL II.xxiii.22.

139 Cf. AL II.xxiii.44.

140 The preceding points are drawn from AL II.xxiii.23-42.

141 AL II.xiii.20-21.

142 AL II.xxiii.14.

143 AL II.xxiii.8.

144 AL II.xxiii.16-18.

145 AL II.xxiii.22; 36.

self-knowledge[146] and therapeutic exercises placed in service of a new kind of half-Puritan, half-Renaissance-courtier ethical ideal. Certainly, this figure's inner life has little about it of the serene equanimity of the ancient *sophoi*, as Bacon's earlier criticisms of the passive, private character of the latter figure would lead us to expect:

> … he should exact an account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one …[147]

**Concluding Remarks**

The conception of philosophy as a therapeutic endeavor provides one vital answer to the question which remains as contemporary today as it was for the Socrates of the *Apology*: *viz.* what good is philosophy? How can the life of the mind, with its questioning of established usages and suspension of accepted pragmatic necessities, be justified to those who do not see its value of feel its pull? In the history of Western philosophy, there are few thinkers who attended to these questions as directly, and at so great a length, as Francis Bacon. Nearly all of his works, as Bacon once wrote, 'went … into the city, none into the temple'[148]: addressing not established divines or academics, but the wider lettered public, advocating for his 'great instauration' of learning, so that it might 'bring about a better ordering of man's life … by the help of sound and true contemplations.'[149] The entire first book of *Advancement of Learning* faces

146 Esp. AL II.xxiii.23-29, where we again are given five *precepts* concerning self-knowledge.

147 AL II.xxiii.39. cf. II.xxiii.22, on philosophical self-knowledge here placed in service of the architecture of fortune: involving 'the reducing of a man's self to this watchful and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, *Et hoc volo, et etiam institutum servare*; so a politic man in everything should say to himself, *Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere* [I will drive this point, yet learn something of future use'.

148 Bacon, 'Letter of Dedication' in Francis Bacon, *Advertisement Concerning Holy War: with Introduction, Notes and Interpretive Essay by Lawrence Lampert* (USA: Waveland Press, 2005), 15.

149 Bacon, in a letter to Isaac Casaubon of 1610, cited at Durant, *Heroes of History*, 319.

the metaphilosophical question head on. Addressed to James I and answering charges pressed against secular inquiry by Churchmen in the name of piety, and political men in the name of civic virtues, it stands as Bacon's extended 'apology' for philosophical inquiry: as well as his pitch for sovereign funding for a renovation of the universities and libraries of the realm.[150] A *politique* himself, Bacon never lost sight of the way that philosophical inquiry does not take place in a political and ethical vacuum. For him, no less than for the ancient philosophers, it should speak to the formation of men and women, even as it pursues mind- and culture-transcendent truths.

The purpose of this essay has been to establish Francis Bacon's credentials as an eloquent advocate of philosophical therapy, in the specific context of his account of ethics or magistral philosophy. Bacon argues firstly for a 'Georgics of the mind' whose features we have been discerning to supplement ancient accounts of the goals and goods of ethics (Part 2); and secondly, for an 'architecture of fortune,' a set of precepts concerning how a *politique* can successfully conduct a life in public affairs (Part 3). Our concern here has not been critical, whatever misgivings can be entertained concerning Bacon's depiction of the ancient philosophers, or about how Bacon's 'portrait' of his fortune-pressing *politique* sits with its framing appeal to Christian *charitas* as the highest end of ethical and religious life.[151] We close here instead by underscoring the way that what we have examined here—Bacon's call for a therapeutic 'Georgics of the mind' within magistral, human

150 AL II.xiii.9.

151 Cf. AL II.xxiii.44, wherein Bacon ends the section on the architecture of fortune by protesting, with Biblical citations, that his aim has not been to abet a 'relentless and sabbathless pursuit of man's fortune'. A secondary aim has been to show the great distance between the generally negative 'fame' Bacon presently enjoys as the father of a reductively, destructively scientistic modernism, and the real extent of Bacon's continuity with renaissance, humanistic culture, together with the sheer scope of his philosophical vision as it is unfolded in The Advancement of Learning. As one hostile twentieth century critic has commented: 'whatever distortion may have occurred' in later receptions of Bacon's work, 'the grandeur of Bacon's imagination and the richness of his vision command respect, and even awe.' White, *Peace amongst the Willows*, 134.

philosophy, one small part of his encyclopedic cataloguing of the sciences—also had a more general pertinence for him. As Soreana Corneanu's *Regimens of the Mind* has shown, even Bacon's *novum organum* for natural philosophy—with its aim of 'the relief of man's estate',[152] so often lamented as a break with ancient wisdom—is shaped by him as a point-by-point therapeutic regime for the 'idols of the human mind': in particular, our all-too-human love of leaping to conclusions which answer well to our present needs, hopes, wishes and desires, on the basis of partial evidences and accepted authorities.[153] Certainly, Bacon's ringing vindications of learning as therapeutic to 'every defect of the mind'[154] have continuing power for us in a time when the atrophy of public language increasingly sees defenders of philosophical inquiry silenced, or reduced to stuttering appeals to 'vocational skills,' 'critical reasoning,' and the like. How much better (and more truthful) it would be, in Bacon's ringing prose, to we remind ourselves and our managers that to philosophise:

> … taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds; … It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides, to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain admiration of anything, which is the root of all weakness. For all things are admired, either because they are new, or because they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find that printed in his heart, *Nil novi super terram*.[155]

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152 AL I.v.11.
153 On the idols of the mind in general, NO I.41-69; on the ease of generalisation and our too-ready propensity to indulge in it, by-passing necessary attention to particulars, AL I.iv.7; II.viii.1, NO I.20, I.51, I.104; CF. also Corneanu, *Regimens of The Mind*, 84-94.
154 Bacon, 'Of Studies'.
155 AL I.viii.1.