Dr Randy Silvers



Senior Lecturer


Faculty of Business and Law


BL Deakin Business School


Melbourne Burwood Campus


Doctor of Philosophy, Arizona State University, 2005
Master of Arts (Economics), Univ. of Calif. (San Diego), 1990
Bachelor of Arts, Stanford University, 1988


As an economist, problems of incomplete information intrigue me, whether in contracting or market situations. The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, and the nuances across different situations, are both important and variegated. As such, my research, and teaching, interests involve principal-agent problems, including some empirical work in baseball, and the social contracts between a government and the citizens.

In my spare time, I enjoy playing games – strategy board games, puzzles, and card games; reading – politics, science and technology, and classic novels; and being active – playing soccer and ultimate, and running. And my labrador puppy is always up to no good, earning the nickname “Diablita.”

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Research interests

Economics of Information

Contract Theory - Principal-Agent Models

Industrial Organization

Philosophy & Economics

Teaching interests

Advanced Microeconomic Theory

Economic Principles

Industrial Organization

Game Theory or Economic Strategy

Units taught

MAE304 Labour Economics

MAE101 Economic Principles


Outstanding Ph.D. Student in Economics; Department of Economics; Arizona State University, 2002.

Excellence in Teaching; School of Accounting, Economics, and Finance; Deakin University, 2012

Excellence in Research, School of Accounting, Economics, and Finance; Deakin University, 2012


Current research projects

How Negative, Supplied, and Positive Rights Delineate What a Government Cannot Do, Must Do, and Can Do

Market Structure and the Value of Information about Unknown Fixed Cost;

Market Structure and the Value of Information about Unknown Marginal Cost;

The Value of Information in a Cournot Duopoly with Externalities in Production;

The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: the Ex Ante Contracting Case;

Assumptions of the Agent’s Risk Preferences in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Project Selection;

Distributional Preferences Under Uncertainty: An Experiment

An Institution-Theoretic Approach to Unpacking Transactions Costs;

The Entrepreneurial Generation of an Innovations Commons from a Knowledge Commons

Measuring the Impact of a Manager: The Case of Major League Baseball

Measuring the Determinants of a Manager’s Salary: The Case of Major League Baseball

Another Look at Maskin-Riley Monopolist's Price-Quantity Schedule


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The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard : the ex post contracting case

R Silvers

(2012), Vol. 74, pp. 352-365, Games and economic behavior, Maryland Heights, Mo., C1


Does momentum still exist in the Australian stock-market?

I Nandha, H Singh, R Silvers

(2012), Vol. 11, pp. 89-92, International journal of business and economics, Taichung, Taiwan, C1


Measuring the contribution of sport to the economy

P Hone, R Silvers

(2006), Vol. 39, pp. 412-419, Australian economic review, Carlton, Vic., C1


The value of information in an agency model with moral hazard

R Silvers

(2004), pp. 1-40, Selected papers from the 33rd Australian Conference of Economists, Sydney Sept. 27-30, 2004, Sydney, N.S.W., E1


Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

H Chade, R Silvers

(2002), Vol. 74, pp. 291-300, Economic letters, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, C1-1


Funded Projects at Deakin

No Funded Projects at Deakin found


No completed student supervisions to report