

**Proposals Received for Second biennial conference of the International Global Ethics Association - June 26-28, 2008 Melbourne, Australia**

**Paper Abstracts Accepted**  
(alphabetical order)

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**Nur Surayyah Madhubala Abdullah**  
University Putra Malaysia

**Our ethical responsibility towards others: An issue of equal moral standing? Implications for moral and citizenship education**

This paper questions whether the idea of ethical responsibility towards others is best underpinned by a notion of equal moral standing in the context of plural societies. It forwards the claim that the idea of equal moral standing offers a weak basis of respect for others. Central to the argument is the idea of others forwarded by this notion of is still one of *us* and *them*- a notion which has effectively kept us apart while trying to promote a weak sense of universalism. Fundamentally, a notion of equal moral standing fails to adequately recognise our shared vulnerability and our preciousness as persons. Instead, it exists on a narrow idea of a person based on a limited notion of differences that further distances our relationship with another. It relies on an idea of moral obligation rather than a deep sense of concern for others. This paper argues that an adequate notion of ethical responsibility towards others rests on a substantive idea of a person based on a dialogical idea of differences. Such a basis rests on the idea of the preciousness as persons drawing upon the ideas of Gaita on others. The paper ends by suggesting that our ethical responsibility for others goes beyond a question of justice – equality - to the idea that we are all *persons* who have a shared stake in the world. In conclusion, it discusses some of the fundamental implications for moral and citizenship education in the context of the role and relevance of this subject in contributing towards the creation of global citizens.

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**Howard Adelman,**  
Griffith University, Australia

**Sovereignty and Empire**

In her Presidential descriptive and pejorative address to the International Studies Association in 2007, Ann Tickner claimed that Bush was creating an economically and militarily powerful American *empire* abroad correlated with domestic repression. Typing a state as an empire and not just a hegemon carries a great deal more evaluative and emotive impact, but does the equation have much cognitive content? Is 'empire' an accurate depiction of America when America eschews responsibility for long term administration of the 'conquered' territory? Why is "empire" associated with negative qualities and how do contemporary empires differ from traditional British, French, Spanish, Portugese empires, from multinational states, from multinational empires such as the Austro-Hungarian empire, and from regional and global hegemony and informal empires? How different is Russia from the Soviet empire that preceded it? If an empire is characterized as the maintenance of non-consensual control over culturally distinct populations, then what is the difference between sovereign states and empires in relationship to inclusion and exclusion when it comes to indigenous populations, minority nationalities, refugees and the double loyalties of diaspora populations? If sovereign nation-states and empires are not clear and distinct categories in which the former supposedly succeeded the latter, but fluid, overlapping, unstable and contested ones, what is the

relationship of empires to sovereign states and how can one be used as a negative evaluative benchmark for the other? This paper will explore the conceptual and normative relations of empire and sovereign state in which the shadow of the present will be used to interrogate the past and the past used to throw light on the present to determine whether there exists a new consensus that re-links IR theory and historiography concerning the *normative* transition from empire to sovereign state and back again.

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**Yousuf Ali**

International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia

### **The Three Abrahamic Faiths and Their Roles in Making Peace, Unity and Co-Existence Through Moral and Ethical, Religious, and Socio-Cultural Transformations.**

This paper examines the interrelationship between the three divine Abrahamic faiths i.e. Christianity, Judaism and Islam in order to make peace, unity and coexistence through the transformation of moral, religious, and socio-cultural values. It argues that proper religious and moral practice and mutual understanding through transformation of values among people of the three faiths constitutes the vital element of peace and unity. Apart from the three religions, the ideological commitment and moral application bear its success or failure. A study of three religions suggests that religious values, religious tolerance, and mutual understanding through a dialogue with the continuity of appropriate and effecting policies play a vital role in order to reduce gap, tension, suspicions, disunity, distrust, enmity, hatred and anger among them. The most important observation is the role of the religious and political authorities who are pursuing the philosophy of monotheism, materialism, secularism, liberalism, modernism, and post modernism in order to penetrate the Muslim World for establishing new colonialism and imperialism. This is impediment morally, ethically and spiritually towards achieving the universal goal of peaceful coexistence, human dignity, freedom, justice and brotherhood among the Abrahamic faiths. This paper expects that the people of the three Abrahamic faiths may live peacefully and survive respectfully only with the implementation of religious and moral values in bridging the gap and reducing the tension between the Western and the Muslim World.

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**Gideon Baker**

Griffith University, Australia

### **To Intervene or not to Intervene? The Undecideability of Humanitarian Intervention**

Doing justice to identity and difference in cosmopolitan ethics, it is argued, requires that we 'defy dialectics' – attempts to subsume particularity within universality. But what place does this leave for universality, specifically for cosmopolitan ethics? One answer to this question is provided by Jacques Derrida in his work on hospitality, where universal accounts of otherness are substituted for a universal openness to the Other. This, it is argued, constitutes a non-dialectical alternative to thinking cosmopolitan ethics since a final decision 'for' either universality or particularity is resisted in the name of a deeper *undecideability* between these two poles, an undecideability that paradoxically opens up space for, indeed requires, decision and therefore responsibility in each case where these two values are at stake. The paper then explores this core claim through an attempted operationalisation of undecideability in a deliberately hard case – humanitarian intervention. Cosmopolitanism, it is argued, involves a perpetual attempt to keep our responsibilities to others in tension with openness to the coming of the Other. Nothing we do for global others, no more hospitality than intervention, can avoid violence to their particularity, but both a universalised commitment to intervention and a universalised commitment to non-intervention could conceivably lead to a situation where

there is no Other left to come. While hospitality sets a real limit to intervention since universal domestication is incompatible with the foreigner and therefore with hospitality itself, intervention is a sometimes necessary extension of hospitality's openness to particular foreigners. Given this, it is argued that it is not a matter of hospitality or humanitarian intervention, but of a cosmopolitics that is at once open to and critical of both.

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**Ricardo Baldissone**

Curtin University, Australia

### **Beyond Cosmopolitanism**

The concept of cosmopolitanism underwent several transformations since the word *cosmopolites*, i.e. citizen of the world, has been coined by the cynic Diogenes in fourth-century B.C.E. Greece. In classic and in medieval times it subsequently mirrored the wide communities of the Hellenistic *koiné*, of the Roman state and of Christendom. Later on, when in modern times the Europeans conquered the world, they also imposed on non-European populations their own concept of the world, which they called nature. Hence, this was the *cosmos* that modern cosmopolitanism offered to share with non-Westerners, who were supposed to be satisfied with their inclusion in the natural world as defined by Western standards. Even multicultural approaches have so far granted only the right to interpret in different ways a supposedly common physical reality, which was already defined by the language of science, i.e. a Western dialect. Therefore, whilst modern cosmopolitanism on the one hand bravely opposed racial, religious and national hatred, on the other hand it continued smuggling Western mononaturalism with unashamed ethnocentric blindness. In particular, drawing on the modern severance of facts from values, cosmopolitanism could maintain that humans inhabit the same common world, despite their different worldviews. This common world was actually devised by seventeenth-century natural philosophers as an absolute guarantee for human communication when the religious was crushed the absolute guarantee of the same one god. Modern thinkers thus perpetuated theologians' fundamentalist approach, according to which the communication between humans does require an absolute guarantee. Old and new clashes of fundamentalisms show instead that dialogue requires the acceptance of the other's difference. Therefore, as humans do not believe in the same reality, we should also accept that they actually inhabit different worlds. Only then could we start to negotiate the due processes to build a common one.

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**Peter Balint**

Australian Defence Force Academy

University of New South Wales, Australia

### **How much social cohesion do we need?**

Part of the backlash against multiculturalism in recent years has involved calls for greater social cohesion on the part of politicians as well as political theorists. Within political theory this line of attack has also been levelled at cosmopolitanism. Arguments for the importance of social cohesion commonly stress its role in achieving and maintaining cooperative projects, such as healthcare, and for welfare redistribution. There are also an argument that living in a cohesive society is simply a good in itself. If these arguments are correct, then without a 'tie' to hold the members of a polity together, these types of ends will not be achievable. Yet social cohesion is not simply some benign good, it has real cost to the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit. This means that while policy and institutional design needs to be careful not to ignore the importance of social cohesion, it must be careful about both the amount aimed for as well as the methods that are used to achieve it. This paper examines the

liberal nationalist argument for social cohesion. It argues (a) that the amount of cohesiveness necessary to achieve legitimate communal ends is often overstated, and (b) that there are better and worse ways of achieving these ends particularly if we hold the individual's freedom to live their life as the please as paramount. The alternatives I discuss are targeted trust building, institutional belonging and ensuring fair social outcomes. By being both more targeted and less identity based, these alternatives have significant advantages over the common national identity approach favoured by liberal nationalists.

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**Anuja Bose**

University of Toronto, Canada

### **Cosmopolitanism, Sovereignty and Biopolitics**

Cosmopolitanism has undergone a revival in political theory. Since liberal cosmopolitanism has been a particularly dominant force in this revival, less attention has been paid to strands of cosmopolitan thinking from other areas in political theory. This paper seeks to explore how cosmopolitan community has been conceptualized in radical variants of political theory, namely in Giorgio Agamben's thought and in Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's collaborative work, *Empire*. There is a distinctive conjuncture between cosmopolitanism, sovereignty, and biopolitics in these writings that is worth exploring. For Agamben, the logic of sovereignty isolates 'bare life' as an exception such that there is an inextricable link between biopolitical rule and sovereignty. In light of this, Agamben argues for a transcendence of sovereignty, which interestingly is imagined as a form of cosmopolitan community beyond the confines of the nation-state. Hardt and Negri are also engaged with problematizing national sovereignty, however they articulate this problem through a different negotiation of cosmopolitanism, sovereignty and biopolitics. For Hardt and Negri, sovereignty no longer operates through an absolute exclusion of bare life but through mechanisms of 'differential inclusion' and 'flexible hierarchies'.

Drawing on a more Foucauldian conception of biopower they argue that sovereignty is able to rule in this manner because the "mechanisms of command become ever more democratic, ever more immanent to the social field and distributed throughout the brains and bodies of citizens" (Hardt and Negri, 2002, 23). In other words, they also conceptualize sovereignty and biopolitics as thoroughly intertwined, but clearly do not reduce biopolitics to the production bare life. Interestingly, it is also their more expansive notion of biopolitics that enable them to conceptualize liberation from sovereign power through the cosmopolitan subjectivity of the multitude. Thus, by positing a link between sovereignty and biopolitics, these thinkers offer a radically new framework for problematizing the nation-state and bring to light the urgency of imagining cosmopolitan conceptions of community that take the problem of sovereign power seriously.

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**Samantha Brennan**

The University of Western Ontario, Canada

### **Children's Rights and Global Justice**

Internationally, children play an unusual role in debates about justice. They are literally the poster children for aid agencies and their faces are the faces of world hunger that we see in newspapers and on television campaigns for aid. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is often held up as a model for international cooperation and rights recognition. Yet, children's rights are also a frequent target of rights skepticism. We seem less secure making judgments about failures to accord children's rights at the international level. While the

relationship between human rights and global justice can be vexed, the relationship between the human rights that attach to children—that is, children’s rights and global justice seems even more difficult to sort out. Why is it that we are more secure in our judgments about the rights of adults than the rights of children? This paper argues that there are three different accounts we might give which explain the difference. The first account draws skeptical conclusions from debates about the very existence of rights for children. I argue that such skepticism is not warranted by our moral and legal practice. The second account looks at the role children play within families. I argue that it is inadequate as a justification of the difference though it may offer some additional explanation as why appeals to children’s rights so rarely move us to action. I think though that there is a third account which holds more promise as a justification of the view that children’s rights are more variable, more flexible, and less likely to justify intervention. This third account borrows from the model of in rights as protecting interests and shows how there is room for more contextual considerations in understanding interests. A problem remains however: We also have different understandings of the length and status of childhood and we may need to decide whether it is childhood and its goods which need protecting or children as persons. I suggest the latter is the only legitimate basis for an appeal to rights which could conceivably play a role in intervention.

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**Gillian Brock**

University of Auckland, NZ

**Global Responsibilities and Duties to Compatriots:  
The Case of Health Care**

How should we weigh up the responsibilities we have to compatriots and non-compatriots? So far discussion aimed at addressing this question has been conducted at a fairly abstract level, and lacks specificity with respect to what our obligations to compatriots and non-compatriots are in a particular domain. By examining particular issues we get a richer sense of what is possible and what might be involved. This kind of analysis can then in turn better inform our theoretical views. In this paper I discuss issues related to our responsibilities for health care, both at home and (mostly) abroad. Examining arrangements concerning health care provision (and the context in which these operate) delivers useful insights. I go on in the final section to a more general discussion of what this analysis implies about how we should weigh up responsibilities to compatriots and non-compatriots.

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**Peter Chang**

La Trobe University, Australia.

***A Confucian-Christian Perspective on the Challenges of Global Pluralism***

In today’s global reality, the multiplicity of voices has complicated the collective capacity to discern and agree on what is or is not ethically permissible. It raises the concern of whether there are common values binding together the world’s diverse traditions. My paper examines this issue from the Confucian and Christian perspectives, drawing on the works of two historical figures, Neo-Confucianist Wang Yang-ming (王陽明) (1472–1529 CE) and Anglican bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752 CE). Wang and Butler assumed the existence of moral norms applicable to all and they also commonly affirmed some universal expectations.

I begin by examining Wang and Butler’s reactions to the pluralistic contexts they faced in 16<sup>th</sup> century Ming China and 17<sup>th</sup> century England, respectively. Their strategy was centered on resolutely maintaining a set of norms considered as foundational. Wang and Butler subjected all issues to these basic criteria and tolerated or prohibited diverse beliefs and practices

according to their conformity or nonconformity to these fundamental standards. These, I submit, represent the universal norms which Wang and Butler assumed to be binding upon all.

My study then compares Wang and Butler's worldviews, specifically their basic norms. There are conspicuous differences in some of their core assumptions, e.g., their radically divergent accounts of the afterlife. Nevertheless, they also share a number of very important tenets, for example, belief in the transcendent and a sanguine regard for human nature. These similarities are critical, because they suggest that Wang's Confucian and Butler's Christian traditions do share certain fundamental suppositions about what is vital to hold together a diverse society.

This paper's ultimate aim is to argue that in light of today's pluralistic challenges, Wang and Butler would urge that to preserve basic cohesion in contemporary global society, we need to, at the minimum, collectively affirm a reverence for the divine and respect for one's fellow humans.

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### **Rawdon Dalrymple**

University of Sydney, Australia

#### **Interests and values: recasting normative IR theory**

This paper summarizes explanations for the language of morals being similar in form to that of factual discourse, whereas it is different in both substance and function. A consequence is that normative arguments in IR cannot be based on ethical foundations with a claimed objective and universal character. Habermas' attempt to provide an objective base for asserted norms by appealing to cognitive features of ethical argument does not suffice. But the substance of his agenda and at least much of CT in IR can be based on Habermas' arguments from *interest* without explicitly or implicitly appealing to values.

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### **Richard Devetak**

University of Queensland, Australia

#### **Rival Stoicisms: State Absolutism and Cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Political Thought**

In contemporary political and international relations theory it is commonplace to associate stoicism with cosmopolitanism. The works of Martha Nussbaum and Andrew Linklater have, in different ways, highlighted the debt Immanuel Kant's cosmopolitanism owes to stoicism. The core of this debt derives from the notion of a 'world citizen' (*kosmopolitês*), famously expressed by Diogenes the Cynic. It attributes a dignity and worth to all humans and imagines a community of humankind. This has contributed to the impression that a natural affinity exists between stoicism and cosmopolitanism. I do not wish to dispute this affinity, however I do want to excavate from the history of political thought an important affinity between stoicism and state absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Perhaps surprisingly, 'neo-stoicism' was employed by Justus Lipsius, Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, among others, to political ends dramatically at odds with Kant. Neo-stoicism was employed by such thinkers to lay the intellectual foundations of the modern state and to justify its specific form of rationality, *raison d'état*. As a political program, neo-stoicism sought to enhance the state's power and effectiveness by building military discipline and accepting the necessity of force in political life. This paper explores the competing interpretations and uses of stoic thought in early modern Europe with the intention of clarifying the conceptual and political stakes for contemporary cosmopolitan theories of politics and international relations.

**Helen Dexter**

University of Salford, UK

**An Uncomfortable Reality: cosmopolitanism, neoconservatism and the legitimization of war.**

The post-September 11<sup>th</sup> world finds the cosmopolitanism of Mary Kaldor, David Held and others of the 'new left' situated within a global context that sees the neoconservatives of the Bush administration intervening militarily to promote a cosmopolitanism of their own.

This paper aims to highlight the difficult relationship that has developed since the Bush administration's War on Terror between the cosmopolitan beliefs of those who have long argued for legal and legitimate humanitarian intervention and the cosmopolitanism being espoused by the neoconservatives of the Bush administration and the Project for the New American Century. Although suggesting that cosmopolitanism is inherent to neoconservatism this paper does not aim simply to draw comparisons between this and the cosmopolitan project of Kaldor and others. Instead, this paper is concerned with how these two cosmopolitan projects interact. There seems to be an implicit assumption within the cosmopolitan oriented International Relations theory of Kaldor, Held and others that a territorially unbounded politics will be a peaceful politics - this may not necessarily be the case. A seemingly stronger cosmopolitan defence of 'the other' has led to what Beck describes as an 'uncomfortable reality', one that cosmopolitan scholars have so far failed to adequately acknowledge, namely 'the paradox that the successful institutionalisation of the cosmopolitan regime that serves the objective of securing the world conjures up the contrary: the legitimisation and legalisation of war.'

The first step towards a truly self-critical cosmopolitanism is to acknowledge the cosmopolitan nature of neoconservatism. This means engaging with neoconservatism as a theory, or persuasion – as Irving Kristol would have it. This paper addresses three criticisms that are often levelled against neoconservatism: firstly that the humanitarian language it speaks is merely rhetoric used to distract attention away from its true motivations; secondly that neoconservatism is a unique political philosophy, an eccentricity in American politics; and finally that neoconservatism is unique to the politics of the United States, distinct from liberal internationalism. These assumptions detach the War on Terror from the development of the 'Good War' and the violent nature of the liberal project. This paper makes the case that the cosmopolitan project of the progressive Left must be more aware of the context into which their discourse is being delivered, particularly at a time when this discourse leads to war.

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**Tony Fitzpatrick**

Nottingham University, UK

**Is the Welfare State Morally Affordable?**

Discussions among social policy commentators about the moral foundations and dimensions of developed welfare states tend not to question their very existence. Some call for the internationalisation of welfare services and institutions – sometimes even for a 'global welfare state' – and others doubt that our global responsibilities make domestic social policies financially affordable. But little consideration has been given to the moral sustainability of developed welfare states. Nor has prolonged attention been provided from within the field of applied ethics, though interesting interventions have been made by Robert Goodin and Chandran Kukathas, among others.

This paper addresses this intellectual and disciplinary gap by asking some key questions.

- Media debates often focus upon the need to restrict inward migration in order to protect popular support for social/welfare expenditure. But do our global responsibilities actually justify mass migration? And, if so, then don't we indeed have an obligation to redirect those resources so they are spent in other ways?
- Depending upon our answer to those questions, what are the possible implications of the resulting cultural diversification for welfare reforms?
- Do our responsibilities to address global impoverishment outweigh obligations to national citizens and neighbours, perhaps even friends and relatives?
- How demanding should global redistribution be? Are the demands of 'domestic social justice' compatible with 'global distributive justice'?

The paper explores a series of hypotheses and frameworks that will enable us to better understand how these issues should be approached. In doing so, it provides a space within which social policy and applied ethics can communicate more effectively about such subjects, given their increasing prominence in the twenty-first century.

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### **Siby K George**

Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India

### **Porous Frontiers, Porous Faces: The Self as Opening towards the World**

The paper defends a moderate, modest and accommodative cosmopolitanism as basic to global ethic, and to that extent it questions the rigorous, impartial variety of cosmopolitanism. The spirit of global ethic is itself consensual and liberal rather than exact and divisive, as it cannot entertain ambitions of another grandiose ethical system, but instead attempts to achieve a minimum harmonious moral solidarity of humanity. An increasingly globalizing planet, mobilized primarily by willful, reasonable and humane beings, need such an ethic for all its beings, and this ethic needs to gain its focus, the paper argues, primarily from a moderately cosmopolitan perspective. Varieties of such cosmopolitanisms, with a rightful recognition of the interplay between the local and the foreign, the dear and the strange, the ethnic and the cosmopolitan, the hostile and the hospitable, can be seen in the writings of Derrida, Levinas, Benhabib, Appiah and others either faintly or more boldly.

The paper looks at the self as the locale of this generic moral cosmopolitanism – the thinking that in some fundamental way every human person is a citizen of the world – subtly underlying much nationalism and every other-centric ethic. What we achieve here is a phenomenology of the cosmopolitan self– itself located and rooted with its moorings in a culture, a religion, an ideology, a language, a politics, a stream of particularly personal experiences but, in effect, simultaneously transcending that very plane, to look out into the world outside of this immensely personalized space, in a relation of bonding with the other. Failure to do so leaves our cosmopolitan discourses empty and makes them an inadequate perspective for building a possible global ethic.

The paper is an attempt to locate the self, shown in our experiences as divided rather than unified, right in the midst of cosmopolitan discourses, and plead for a middle ground between empty, almost ethereal, cosmopolitanism and a parochial sense of native environment, by closely reading the recent spurt of literature that has reference to this problematic. It also draws sporadically on the Indian context and stories like that of Mahatma Gandhi, to drive home the ambivalences of cosmopolitanism buried within the self.

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**Pablo Gilabert**

Assistant Professor. Department of Philosophy. Concordia University, Montreal.  
Visiting Fellow. Philosophy Program. Australian National University.

**Is the Scope of Distributive Justice Global?**

This paper addresses the question whether the scope of egalitarian distributive justice is global. Two strategies for arguing that the scope of distributive justice is not global are elucidated and criticized. The first strategy draws on a normative premise involving an associativist version of distributive egalitarianism according to which duties of egalitarian distribution apply only among those who share certain relevant forms of associative interaction and an empirical premise claiming that current trends of globalization do not amount to associative interaction of the relevant kind. The second strategy relies on a normative premise involving a humanist form of egalitarianism according to which duties of egalitarian distribution apply in principle among all persons *qua* persons regardless of preexistent facts of association, but also holds that current international conditions are such that, due to institutional and motivational deficits, true global egalitarian distribution is not feasible. I argue, against the first strategy, that we need not appeal to associativism to ground principles of global justice and, against the second strategy, that the institutional and motivational problems of feasibility can be addressed in such a way that a clear and expansive agenda for global egalitarianism can be developed. This paper thus claims that the scope of distributive justice is indeed global, and provides the rudiments of a theoretical framework to elucidate and show the satisfaction of the desirability and feasibility conditions determining the scope of distributive justice.

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**Howard Harris**

University of South Australia, Australia

**& Katalin Illes**

Anglia Ruskin University, UK

**Teaching as a form of intercultural dialogue**

Contemporary university education is internationalised and often avowedly cosmopolitan. This paper examines some intersections between internationalisation, the cosmopolitan approach and global ethics. It points to the important role of dialogue in global ethics, especially in the classroom or online learning situation and outlines a number of effective methods for developing dialogue skills in an intercultural university context.

Part 1 notes that despite an acceptance by many individuals and organisations that the moral standing of all people is equal, there is also acknowledgement of cultural difference. The practice of global ethics is complicated by that dual context. Universities have a role in the examination of these issues both in scholarly debate and in teaching. In education, aspects of systems theory – especially open systems and complexity theory – can, we contend, be more helpful to an understanding intercultural education, than classifications such as the Hoffstede dimensions which can become stereotypes and limit understanding.

Part 2 focuses on the importance of dialogue as a tool of global ethics, looking at it both as an interaction across system boundaries - particularly across cultural boundaries - and as a means of learning about oneself and one's own culture so as to be better able to engage effectively with others in moral debate. The systems approach is developed to show that, within the educational environment, the classroom (or online study group) is the place where change is most likely to occur. Teachers have, we believe, a responsibility to develop the

potential students have to participate in open dialogue, even where that may lead to heightened understanding of individual difference. Practical examples from the authors' experience will demonstrate how reflective journals, problem-based team projects, debate, case studies, and narrative can be used to illustrate the importance of listening and to develop a capacity for true dialogue in both teachers and students.

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**Paul Healy**

Swinburne University of Technology, Australia

**Situated Cosmopolitanism, and the Conditions of its Possibility:  
Transformative Dialogue as a Response to the Challenge of Difference**

The challenge of accommodating difference has traditionally proved highly problematic for cosmopolitanism proposals, given their inherently universalistic thrust. Today, however, we are acutely aware that in failing to give difference its due, we stand to perpetrate a significant injustice through negating precisely what differentiates diverse groupings and confers on them their identity. Moreover, in an increasingly pluralistic and multicultural world it has become clear that doing justice to difference is an essential prerequisite for the internal flourishing as well as peaceable coexistence of diverse cultural and other groupings. Accordingly, as a corrective for the homogenising presuppositions of highly a universalistic and decontextualised template like the Habermasian, the present paper defends the need for a situated, dialogical approach which can not only accommodate difference but also treat it as a resource for promoting mutual understanding and potentially transformative learning.

In thus defending the merits of a situated, dialogical template, the present paper also seeks to shed light on the conditions of its possibility with a view to facilitating its practical implementation along with enhancing its theoretical cogency. To this end, I argue the need to overcome significant structural limitations of the Habermasian discourse model, while aspiring to preserve and enhance its distinctive strengths. Specifically, I highlight the need for a thoroughgoing reassessment of such core tenets as the symmetry requirement, the insistence on consensus as outcome, and argumentative deliberation as the means of achieving this. Proceeding thus, I defend the merits of situated cosmopolitanism grounded in plurivocal transformative dialogue as a counterbalance to an unqualified universalism. On this basis, I defend openness to otherness under appropriately structured dialogical conditions as the primary prerequisite for a viable cosmopolitanism that can meet the needs of an increasingly pluralistic and multicultural world.

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**Lili Hernandez**

University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

**Cosmopolitanism: collective consciousness as everyday life**

Most accounts on cosmopolitanism stress, in one way or another, the idea of community among all human beings. A wide variety of views appear as to how this universal community is – or is not – achievable. We find accounts on moral cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism, economic cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism and so forth. The notion of cosmopolitanism has been used to point towards philosophical theories, attitudes, ideologies, policies, traits and systems, amongst many others. All such views advocate the cosmopolitan ideal. Although the concept arose in the first instance as an allegory for a way of life, very little has been said about cosmopolitanism as everyday living experience. Erasmus of Rotterdam spoke of cosmopolitanism as a way to achieve world-wide peace and harmony amongst human beings. However, how is world-wide peace ever to be achieved when there is

no 'individual-wide' peace? How can we learn to live peacefully *without* when we have not learnt to find peace *within*? This paper addresses such questions drawing upon the notion of *collective consciousness* which has increasingly gained attention in academic spheres, including that of science. Collective consciousness will be discussed here against the cosmopolitan ideal that lacks connection with everyday life. Both ethics and praxis are explored as a way to bridge the gap between cosmopolitanism at a global level and the practice of cosmopolitanism in everyday life. The assumption is that if cosmopolitanism is not made part of the everyday, the notion may well remain meaningless discourse. The ethics that this togetherness implies at global level will be amply discussed. Buddhist notions such as *being alone with others* and *authentic being with others* will be used here. In addition to scientific studies that have been developed in the field of collective consciousness, empirical research will be brought into the discussion to illustrate how this sense of collectivity is already experienced by individuals in different parts of the world.

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**Wayne Hope**

Auckland University of Technology, NZ

### **Global Capitalism, Temporality and Cosmopolitanism**

Within contemporary globalisation the deterritorialisation of time and space has formed the basis of a new cosmopolitanism of global interdependencies, intercultural communication and transnational democratic fora. Within contemporary global capitalism however, the drive toward inter-networked real time and the general acceleration of economic activity polarises the human condition. Wealthy global elites can plug into the distanced real time flows of communication which conjoin transnational corporations, supranational institutions, high rise enclaves, gated suburbs, luxury resorts and luxury forms of transportation. Meanwhile, slum dwellers landless labourers, illegal migrants subcontracted workers and the incarcerated poor are consigned to lifeworlds where time is experienced as exhaustion, boredom, insecurity or fate. Furthermore, the global pervasiveness of real time, acceleration and inter networked immediacy generates an all encompassing sense of the present devoid of world historical memory. Under these circumstances, I will argue cosmopolitanism serves primarily to ideologically obscure the temporal configurations of global wealth and poverty

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**Keith Horton**

University of Western Australia, Australia

### **'Justice, Charity and World Poverty'**

What, if anything, are those of us who live in developed countries morally required to do in order to help tackle severe poverty in developing countries? Both in the philosophical literature and in the wider community, discussion of this issue tends to be structured by a sharp distinction between two kinds of duties: duties of justice, on the one hand, and duties of charity or beneficence, on the other. I argue that this tendency has a number of unfortunate consequences.

From a theoretical point of view, it prevents us from accommodating the complexity of our normative relations to the global poor. And from a practical point of view, it prevents us from making the strongest case we can that we are morally required to tackle world poverty. I also outline a different way of thinking about our duties to the global poor that avoids these problems.

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## **Faorligh Hunter**

Deakin University, Australia

### **Cosmopolitanism as a pre-occupation of an Elite? The case of refugee young people**

This paper joins Vertovec and Cohen (2002, 14) in questioning the notion that cosmopolitanism is solely the province of a wealthy, jet-setting, largely Western elite by considering the experiences and actions of a clearly marginalized non-western, non-elite: refugee young people. The paper takes as its starting point, the observation made by Robbins and Cheah (eds, 1998, 1) that cosmopolitanism “should be extended to transnational experiences that are particular rather than universal and that are unprivileged – indeed, often coerced.” In an attempt however, to ‘link the local to the global’, the paper will also consider placing these *particular* experiences within a more *universalist* context: linking cosmopolitanism and human rights.

Drawing on cosmopolitan and human rights literature as well as the real life experiences of refugee young people in Melbourne, Australia, this paper seeks to explore notions of cosmopolitanism as both non-elite and non-western. If Cheah is right and “cosmopolitanism and human rights are the two primary ways of figuring the global as the human” (Cheah, 2006, 3) then refugee young people have a real stake in articulating a non-elitist cosmopolitanism.

The experiences of refugee young people suggest that a globalised, cosmopolitan world is not just the playground of a global elite but is an important and real element in the consciousness of a group of highly marginalized, yet by cosmopolitan standards, equal, members of the next generation.

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## **Eduard Jordaan**

Singapore Management University, Singapore

### **Cosmopolitanism, Freedom And Indifference: A Levinasian Perspective**

Although thousands of people daily die preventable, poverty-related deaths through no fault of their own, we, who could have done something to improve the plight of at least some of these extremely poor people, generally do not consider ourselves guilty or irresponsible for having done so little, if anything, to remedy this situation. Such seeming indifference clashes with the central tenet of moral cosmopolitanism, namely that ‘every human being has a global stature as ultimate unit of moral concern’ (Pogge). Despite moral cosmopolitanism’s concern for the world’s poor and its concomitant heavy moral demands, cosmopolitans establish a limit to the self’s responsibility for the global poor. This contrasts with Emmanuel Levinas’s view that the self has an infinite responsibility for the other, a responsibility that derives from the self’s questioning of the impact of his freedom on others.

From a Levinasian perspective, cosmopolitanism’s restriction of the self’s responsibility for others holds a number of implications, such as lending legitimacy to a disregard of the other; creating of a sphere of rightful indifference to the demands of the other; helping us understand why we are able to maintain a good conscience amid the preventable dying of the world’s poor, suggesting that cosmopolitanism is less demanding than it appears, especially considering the variety of ways to establish some freedom from responsibility for the other on offer in cosmopolitan theory; forestalling an ethical awakening to the other by creating a domain in which the self is considered rightfully free; constraining the achievement of a more just and caring global order, given that, from a Levinasian perspective, a better justice is built on the self’s open-ended concern for the other; and pointing to a tension at the heart of

cosmopolitanism in light of the coexistence of elements that both frustrate and aspire to the achievement of global justice.

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**Suzy Killmister**

University of Melbourne, Australia

### **Recognition and Equality: Defending Group Rights**

Both within and between states, a tension exists between the demands of equality and the demands of difference. Liberal theory has time and again incorporated previously excluded categories of person into the circle of moral concern, and it has done so through the recognition of commonality. Seeing the other as sharing common features with the self provides the grounds for extending equal concern and respect. Group rights theory threatens to subvert this understanding of justice, by suggesting that it is through the recognition of *difference*, rather than commonality, that we can establish what is due to others.

In this paper, I support the call for group rights. Specifically, I defend the concept of group rights from two separate lines of attack, both of which are connected to a normative cosmopolitanism. Firstly, I take issue with a claim made by Jeremy Waldron in his article “Minority Rights and the Cosmopolitan Alternative” that attachment to a localized identity is an anachronism in the world we now live in – in other words, that group rights are predicated upon an impoverished conception of the self. Secondly, I defend group rights from the claim made by Brian Barry that recognition of difference is incompatible with the principle of egalitarianism – a principle which I take to be central to the cosmopolitan project. By showing that group rights are compatible with both the cosmopolitan self and global equality, I hope to indicate that they should not be excluded from our vision for a just cosmopolitan world.

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**David Kirchhoffer**

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

### **Questioning Human Dignity: The Dimensions of Dignity Model as a Bridge between Cosmopolitanism and the Particular**

The concept of the dignity of the human person has been called into question for a number of reasons. The most serious indictment against the claim of the universality of human dignity arises from the particular experience of the horrible things that people do to each other. If dignity is just a ‘vacuous concept’ then the notion of universal human rights and the claim of cosmopolitanism that all human beings form a single moral community are also called into question. In order to answer this challenge a close reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was undertaken in order to see whether the conception of dignity expressed therein might in fact take these ambiguities into account. The analysis considered aspects of the historical development of the text to ascertain how the drafters may have envisioned the notion of human dignity. The result of this analysis was the Component Dimensions of Dignity model. This model suggests that dignity is not a simplistic, univocal concept that arbitrarily expresses the equal worth of all human beings, but rather a rich, multi-faceted concept that can potentially serve both a descriptive and normative function in ethical discourse. The model defines human dignity in terms of four Component Dimensions—existential, behavioural, cognitive and social—each of which consists of a Complementary Duality comprising two facets held in tension along an axis of the Already and the Not Yet. Thus defined human dignity is something that all human beings have by virtue of their inherent human capacities, and, at the same time, something that all human beings seek to acquire, in terms of self-worth, through morally good behaviour. Moreover, one ultimately only fulfils

one's dignity if all human beings have dignity. Hence, dignity is Already a universal truth, but Not Yet realised in every particular life.

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**Eszter Kollar**

LUISS University of Rome, Italy

### **Global Justice from Social Justification: The Boundary-Problem in Political Constructivism**

This paper engages with the problem of discrepancy between the requirements of social and global justice from a Rawlsian perspective. While much of the debate has a basic structure focus, I approach the problem from political constructivism. I construe Rawls' conception of *political* justification as *justifiability*, and show why the *feasibility* constraint on a theory of justice has a bearing on the scope of justice. A feasible conception of justice for a pluralist society is a view from *somewhere*, a social point of view rooted in publicly shared values. Thus the boundaries of justice are constituted by the limits of justifiability. The limiting condition, so conceived, draws the boundaries of a 'justificatory community', i.e. the community in which claims of justice make sense, according to the range of persons among who certain public ideals can be taken for granted.

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**John Lango**

Hunter College of the City University of New York, USA

### **The Security Council And The Use Of Military Force: Disagreement And Compromise About Applications Of Generalized Just War Principles**

In a high-level panel report commissioned by then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a wide range of kinds of threats to the security of states and human beings is surveyed: poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation, conflict between states, conflict within states, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. Significantly, this report contains the proposal that, whenever the Security Council deliberates about authorizing the use of military force to counter a security threat, it ought to utilize 'five basic criteria of legitimacy', criteria that are tantamount to generalizations of the traditional just war principles of just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality, and reasonable chance of success. In this paper, it is argued that these legitimacy criteria should be accepted by the Security Council as a moral framework for moral debates about the use of military force.

A main theme of the paper is that acceptance of the criteria by the Security Council is compatible with profound moral disagreement both about how they should be understood and about how they should be applied. Nonetheless, in the event of such disagreement, sometimes it could be imperative for members of the Security Council to strive to achieve a truly moral compromise. For the sake of concreteness, it is imagined how members of the Security Council might engage in moral debate about the following question. How should the last resort criterion be applied to the current case of conflict in the Darfur region of the Sudan? It is suggested how a principled compromise might be achieved between those members of the Security Council (if any) who favor prompt armed humanitarian intervention in Darfur and those members who favor continued negotiations.

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**Constantinos Laoutides,**  
Deakin University, Australia

### **The two faces of Janus: Resistance and emancipation in secessionist politics**

The paper examines the ethics of secession as an international phenomenon and puts forward an ethical discussion of territorial disintegration from the perspective of International Political Theory. The debate over the justification of secession has gained pace during the last twenty years within the literature of political thought. Consequently, several approaches, mainly from political philosophers, attempted to establish a convincing argument for the justification of secession. Ranging from individualistic to group arguments, theories of secession sought to situate territorial partition within the context of state politics. However, this intellectual endeavour marginalized a significant parameter of the secessionist phenomenon, namely the relation of political and territorial disintegration with international relations.

In addition, scholars of International Relations Theory have not placed emphasis on secession regardless of the fact that many international conflicts currently include secessionist claims and most of them involve a certain level of violence varying from sporadic terrorist activity to fully fledged military operations.

In the paper, I focus on two arguments: first, I analyse the secessionist phenomenon as an act of resistance which, however, is characterized as non-emancipatory because it reproduces patterns of domination between social groups. Second, I examine the conditions under which territorial separatism can be considered within a cosmopolitan context. To this end the emancipatory politics of secession will be discussed with the focus on the idea of responsibility which should be informed by universal moral principles that do not give precedence to national ties or elitist privileges. In this new context, secessionist movements can be viewed as the means of achieving emancipation for the community at stake but simultaneously the movement should conduct its political struggle in a responsible way. Finally, the argument is illustrated by references to real cases as a way of contextualizing the theoretical debate.

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**Holly Lawford-Smith**  
Australian National University, Australia

### **Feasibility Constraints and the Cosmopolitan Vision**

What would people have to be like for a cosmopolitan social vision to be realized? Are people like this? If not, how likely is it that they could become this way? In this paper I target a few strong variants of cosmopolitanism, drawing from biology, moral psychology, sociology and economics to propose feasibility constraints appropriate to them. This is not a purely factual assessment ('how well do modern humans compare to the citizens imagined by various cosmopolitan proposals?') but also a speculative, evaluative one ('which cosmopolitan proposals are the most promising, taking seriously the feasibility constraints mentioned here?'), introducing (but not resolving) the issue of precisely how feasibility and desirability should interact in political theory.

**Allan Layug**

University of the Philippines, Philippines

**The Problem of Global Justice: Political, Not Moral**

Why is global justice – defined as either impartiality, or fairness, or equality - problematical? Is it because of the lack of common foundation for global ethics to ground it, or the lack of moral consensus of bringing it about arising out of pervasive value pluralism? Or, is it because of the unfeasibility of addressing the demands of global justice and the impracticality of fulfilling the moral duty imposed upon individuals, states, and international institutions owing to, *inter alia*, structural and geopolitical realities of international life?

This paper argues that the problem of global justice is more political than moral in nature, that is, it has more to do with the feasibility and practicality of global justice than with finding the common foundation of global ethics grounding just human conduct, state behavior, global governance; forging of moral consensus; or the establishing of cosmopolitan community founded on egalitarianism, humanism, solidarism, however desirable, albeit not without problems, these moral requirements/ideals may be.

The idea is that although the political and moral problematique predicated upon global justice are mutually reinforcing, in that the latter would be nothing but empty rhetoric without the realization that the political entails, and the former would be nothing but blind attempts at realization unless grounded on moral foundation, the political takes precedence because it bespeaks of the limits and possibilities of the moral – exactly the realities circumscribing the flourishing of global justice. More to the point, unless and until conditions of international life – e.g. power over value, conflict of interest, role of hegemony – are changed, the moral problematique or the *ration d 'etre* of why there need be global justice based on the moral attempt at making morality relevant to international politics, will always be subordinated to the political problematique because such an attempt can only be crystallized within the realm of possibilities that the political encompasses. Put differently, this paper argues that the “ought” of global justice does not, ipso facto, imply “can”.

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**Michael Leahy**

Deakin University, Australia

**'Cosmopolitanization': a path to secular salvation?**

'Cosmopolitanization', Ulrich Beck's version of 'cosmopolitanism', is his theory of the present state of the project of secularisation begun by the European Enlightenment. Beck acknowledges that that project in its initial phase, which he terms the 'First Modernity', has generated the uncertainties and risks that threaten contemporary societies rather than the certainties and control that it promised. He also recognises that the project has failed to eliminate the national and religious divisions spawned by the Reformation. However, Beck sees these outcomes as challenges to embark on a 'Second Modernity' rather than as causes for abandoning the Enlightenment project. The epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning the Enlightenment secularisation process, in other words, are not falsified by these outcomes but merely rendered in need of revision in the light of them. It is characteristic of paradigm disputes that their fundamental assumptions are protected in this way. In modern liberal democracies, however, the fundamental assumptions of the Enlightenment project have been protected as much by state sanction as by epistemic competition over its religious rival. Assumptions thus sanctioned take on the status of dogma, the very status Enlightenment epistemology was meant to discredit.

In this paper I argue that logically Beck's theory lacks coherence, and empirically his account of how divisions are healed does not square with the healing process followed by the Catholic and Lutheran churches, two of the former major antagonists in the Reformation. I conclude by supporting the view that the issue between reason and revelation cannot be settled by any conclusive adjudication of the arguments in favour of either. Rather it is, in Charles Taylor's phrase, a shift in 'social imaginaries' that has facilitated the state sanctioning of the Enlightenment worldview over its religious rival.

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**Claire Loughnan**

University of Melbourne, Australia

### **An impossible cosmopolitanism? On Levinas and the 'border'**

As a means of exclusion of the foreigner, border protection is becoming a stronger feature of the political landscape, despite growing support for cosmopolitanism. Across much of Europe for example, claims for membership to a burgeoning European Union suggest a trend towards a more cosmopolitan world. However this is being accompanied by calls for an intensification of exclusionary practices, particularly in relation to the movement of immigrant labour and refugees.

Whilst cosmopolitanism is underpinned by a notion of common membership or humanity, the ethics of Levinas suggests that any attempt to produce unity or fusion through an assumption of 'sameness' leads dangerously to a totalizing move in which the other is made captive to our own image. For Emmanuel Levinas, the construction of our humanity is unavoidably conditioned by our relation to the other. This is most powerfully symbolised, he says, by the orphan, the widow, or the refugee, to whom we are infinitely responsible. Moreover, the uniqueness and transcendence of the other is something we can never hope to grasp entirely, producing an inevitable limit to representation.

Adopting Lindhal's notion that the very formation of borders is itself a political act, and not pre-political, the moment of exclusion itself takes on a political mantle. This might suggest that borders are a necessary condition of political life. But what are the implications for this of an ethic which founds our subjectivity instead upon what is located *outside* of ourselves? If humanity is essentially the product of our relation to what is outside of us, then to what extent is a truly cosmopolitan world possible? This paper sets out to explore the implications of an ethic which urges that we are defined by the stranger outside, for the possibility of an authentic cosmopolitanism.

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**Julie MacKenzie**

Massey University, Australia

### **Arendtian Trajectories for Cosmopolitanism**

Hannah Arendt suggests in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* that the conception of the rights of man reaches its crisis point when confronted with the figure of the refugee: that is, "at the very moment when those who professed to believe [in human rights] were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except that they were still human". This paper explores the uses to which Arendt's insight has been put by two thinkers, Seyla Benhabib and Giorgio Agamben, each of whom lay claim to a significant Arendtian debt in their philosophical thought. While Benhabib works with Arendt to reconstruct the notion of rights so they can operate along more felicitous, cosmopolitan lines,

Agamben's use of Arendt counsels caution in any attempt to extend the reach of juridical frameworks on a cosmopolitan scale. This paper considers these diverging interpretations of Arendt, not with the intention of adjudicating upon the fidelity of each to Arendt, but rather as a frame through which to consider the oscillation between optimism and circumspection that characteristically accompanies the advent of cosmopolitics.

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**Anna Malavisi**

Michigan State University, USA

### **Cosmopolitanism and the Mitigation of Global Inequities**

The Eighth Goal of the Millennium Development Goals is: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases such as tuberculosis. In Bolivia, a country with a population of over 8,000,000 people, it was claimed in 2006 that there were 2366 confirmed cases of HIV. In contrast, it has been estimated that 50% of the population is infected with Chagas Disease with 60% of the country declared as endemic. Bolivia has the highest incidence of infection in the region, the majority of who live in poverty-stricken areas. Chagas disease has also been referred to as the 'forgotten disease' or the 'silent killer' since very little research is carried out to find a cure or a vaccine and it is often absent from the development agendas of many bilateral and international agencies. This paper will discuss how global development policies perpetuate social inequities within developing countries and how cosmopolitanism can mitigate global inequalities. I will argue this by demonstrating that the formulation of policies and their subsequent implementation respond to global trends rather than priorities identified within individual states. This poses significant ethical concern and is evident of a form of distributive injustice as other devastating diseases such as Chagas Disease are inadequately addressed. International Development Agencies feel compelled to devise their plans to comply with donors strategies tending to ignore any ethical issues such as distributive justice. A cosmopolitan view would encourage an egalitarian approach to development thereby responding to the needs and demands of all individuals with an equitable distribution of human and economic resources.

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**Vince Marotta**

Deakin University, Australia

### **The Hybrid Stranger and Cosmopolitan Self**

The paper critically identifies and examines the affinities between the category of the stranger & the cosmopolitan attitude/disposition that underlies recent theories of cosmopolitanism. I argue that the cosmopolitan attitude can be located within the sociological discourse of the stranger. Thus one needs to reconceptualise the cosmopolitan self in terms of the cosmopolitan stranger.

This new subject develops a more perceptive, broader and keener insight of the social world that is not available than those confined to a universalistic or particularistic perspective. The final part of the paper challenges this assertion through a critical assessment of the so-called in-between position occupied by the cosmopolitan stranger.

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## **Melville Miranda**

Victoria University, Australia

### **Morality, Ethics, and Globalisation**

Frost (1966) has written that “although normative questions regularly arise in the day-to-day practice of international politics the discipline of international relations [IR] has not accorded ethical theory a central place within it” (p.1). Some of the more significant reasons for this marginalisation of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature (Beitz 1979); the positivist bias characteristic of what Hoffman (1977) has called “a general devaluation of ethical analysis within moral philosophy (Brown 1992); and the strict separation of international theory from political theory (Brown 1992; Jackson 1990). Despite decades of self-criticism, and reflecting the hegemonic power of *la bureaucratie du savoir* in attributing greater value to certain kinds of inquiry, mainstream IR theory is still dominated by technical interest (Habermas 1971) in explaining and controlling state behaviour, which is evidenced in the dominance of explanatory-analytical theory and, to some extent, the continuing search for regulations and law-like (deductive-nomological) generalisations.

To be sure, a relative lack of normative theorising in the field of IR is not due to a deficiency of pertinent issues. Normative questions permeate the very fabric of contemporary international and global politics, and it is curious why, in the name of “Science,” leading IR scholarship self-consciously sweeps away their centrality. As Frost (1996) points out, each day shareholders, voting citizens, military personnel, members of the bureaucracy, and statesmen are faced with important questions such as: When is war justified? When is intervention in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state justified? How are we to deal with different groups’ competing claims to the same territory? Have we any moral obligations to those suffering from famine in other states? Should multinational corporations have a right to exploit moral and legal standards that exist in other parts of the world? What duties do we have to address global inequalities in wealth? What is our moral responsibility to future generations regarding sustainable stewardship of the Earth’s ecosystems?

In the light of this intellectual and practical disarray, the paper will *creatively* argue that a return to “political theory” in IR is both necessary and desirable.

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## **T. Brian Mooney**

Singapore Management University, Singapore

### **Universalist Ethics: The Challenge of Loyalty**

Loyalty is an important element in individual relations, in social and institutional frameworks and in general in the proper functioning of an orderly society. The loyalties we have *and feel* for friends and family members play a crucial role in creating and balancing many of the most important relationships we have as individuals in our lives. It is almost certainly true that without the affective concerns of loyalty we would be unable to enter into the kinds of personal relationships which count among the greatest goods of a human life. Without loyalty we would be unable to enter into or maintain such central human goods as friendship and love relations and we would even have difficulty in retaining the affections of close family relations. Outside these close personal relations loyalty is also important in our wider relations with the communities we live in and the micro-communities we choose to involve ourselves with. A person who has no sense of loyalty to the people living in the same street or neighbourhood such that he/she will be unwilling to help protect neighbours from minor infractions from “outsiders” is thought of as a bad neighbour. Such a person is someone whose range of affective participation in the communal life of a community is deficient. Moreover loyalty is a trait that plays an important role in our (often) chosen participation in social settings such as

football clubs, cooperative societies and the like. In such fora where loyalty is not forthcoming other members treat disloyalty often in very bitter ways. It is then surprising that given the importance that loyalty plays in our lives that it has received very little sustained reflection in philosophical literature either historically or in contemporary moral philosophy.

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**Rekha Nath**

University of Melbourne, Australia

### **On the Bounds of Citizenship**

The increasingly globalized character of our world should lead political philosophers to re-examine the role of the state as the primary locus of moral concern. As Onora O'Neill writes, '[b]oundaries creep into political philosophy without us noticing'. What is particularly problematic, I argue in this paper, is the tendency for such universal ideals as the moral equality of all individuals to collapse into the requirement to show equal concern for all of one's compatriots. I begin by providing a brief argument of why it makes sense for institutional interaction rather than formally delineated political units to map onto the bounds of egalitarian concern. Following this, I discuss how appeals for global egalitarianism have been dismissed as utopian, undesirable, and untenable for reasons of wrongly regarding its demands as essentially distributive rather than social in nature. Thus, attempts to merely extend state-based conceptions of egalitarianism to the global realm have been rife with problems, generally leading to the wholesale rejection of global egalitarianism.

My own proposed account of social equality focuses on both relations among institutionally connected individuals as well as the processes and norms that define members' roles vis-à-vis one another. I discuss how the idea of equal status, exemplified by national citizenship, is central to claims of social equality. Yet the notion of 'citizenship' is too narrowly defined on a global level and thus face some criticisms that are well-articulated by David Miller. I seek to defend the plausibility of endowing individuals world-wide with equal status as a requirement of dense social and economic interaction that is part and parcel of the process of globalization.

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**Bill Ndi**

Deakin University, Australia

### **Globalisation and Global Ethics: A Quaker Concern**

This paper examines 17<sup>th</sup> Century Early Quaker advocacy for equality, global unity, intercultural and religious tolerance, humanitarian assistance, protection of human dignity irrespective of race, gender, age or religion. Over and above Quakers also called upon the nations of Europe to unite in an effort to bring peace to the continent. The fight to attain this universal goal of peaceful coexistence was first recognised by the League of Nations in 1922 when Quakers were invited to advise the supra national body on global peace and conflict management. Again in 1947, they were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for their humanitarian assistance during World War II. Beyond this advocacy, I intend to explore from an historical perspective the Quaker push for cosmopolitanism and the stance adopted by its early advocates. For Early Quakers, even though the term globalisation is not used, the world as a single nation void of social hierarchy, racial discrimination, etc. was the only possible way to have international peace. And ethically speaking, could international peace as a construct form the basis of global ethics? What is the individual's responsibility in bringing about this world peace in a cosmopolitan world? This paper expects to portray the continuing relevance

of Quaker values in relation to contemporary ethical notions of Globalisation and cosmopolitanism.

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**Nedim Nomer**

Sabancı University, Turkey

### **The Idea of Civilization: A View from Turkey**

This paper aims to shed light on the views of Ziya Gökalp, a Turkish social philosopher who played a decisive role in the formation of the ideology of the Turkish Republic in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. I am especially concerned with a distinction Gökalp makes throughout his writings between civilization and culture. For him this distinction was not just academic but also related to the predicament of Turks who had recently lost their imperial social institutions. Thus they were faced with the task of creating a new set of social and political institutions and, with this, a new collective identity.

In this paper I cast doubt on the commonly held view that Gökalp was not an original thinker in his definitions of civilization and culture, that he simply borrowed them from various West European thinkers such as Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Toennies. I suggest that while there can be no doubt that Gökalp was influenced by Western thinkers, he was in many ways an independent thinker in his own right. The originality of his views can be appreciated especially vis-à-vis his idea of civilization. He suggested, in contrast to many of his European counterparts, that civilization is essentially a matter of choice and exchange, and not something produced by, or inevitably associated with, a specific culture. Gökalp thus avoids not only determinism but also ethnocentrism that characterized most of the social scientific theories in Europe of his time.

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**James O' Connor**

University of Helsinki, Finland

### **Fundamental Harms as the Central Focus for Moral Universalism**

In the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the weapon of sexual violence is used on a massive scale. A recent UN report describes 'an unimaginable brutality that goes far beyond rape': women and girls of all ages are raped, mutilated, enslaved, tortured, and survivors frequently stigmatized, impoverished and left to fend for themselves. This horrifying state of affairs has continued for years, largely uninterrupted by the kinds of interference from the outside world that would most help. Acts that should "shock the moral conscience of mankind" into action are in effect treated with indifference. Why?

With the DRC case as background, my answer starts by suggesting that academic work on global ethics has not yet clarified the importance of a universal moral conscience. Debates remain bogged down in universalism-versus-particularism disputes and insufficient effort has been made to clarify the types and relevance of moral obligations we have to the wider world. In general, the channels and terminology through which global ethics is debated contribute to poor public familiarity and involvement with the ideas most essential to a world facing many grave problems.

The purpose of the paper is to contribute to making global ethics debates more accessible by clarifying, in the most concrete terms available, what is most important about the idea of moral universalism. The central proposal of the paper is that moral universalism be understood as

being primarily focused on fundamental harms – simply meaning severe physical and psychological damages (to humans in this case, but the core argument is applicable also to many other life forms). By keeping fundamental harms as the central reference point, rather than higher, more equivocal abstractions such as values and capabilities, moral universalism and its requirements might receive more widespread awareness, discussion and implementation.

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**Roderic Pitty**

University of Western Australia, Australia

### **Global governance, cosmopolitan duty and Indigenous Peoples' autonomy**

Responses to various claims by cosmopolitans for an ethic of global citizenship have questioned not only the normative value of such an ethic, but especially its practical impact in a very unequal world. Some critics (e.g. Zolo 2007) see global citizenship as an interesting distraction, because the key problem of agency (what social forces are inspired by such an ethic?) has been fudged.

One proponent of global citizenship, Linklater (2007: 123), agrees that 'the most important question about cosmopolitan democracy' is whether this ideal can reduce global inequalities of power and wealth. He endorses an ethic which affirms that global governance 'should rest on the consent of all peoples', especially the 'most vulnerable members of world society'. Yet what happens if we judge this ethic not only normatively, but in terms of how it helps the vulnerable 'to protest against the harm that others do to them, to register their views when others benefit unfairly from their weakness and to seek external assistance in reducing avoidable suffering' (ibid: 124)? Can a cosmopolitan ethic help such people to end their marginalisation? The UN General Assembly's endorsement in 2007 of a *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* provides a key example for assessing what Linklater calls the important role of 'the sphere of cosmopolitan duty', which he sees as compensating for vulnerable peoples' exclusion from global institutions (124).

This paper examines what a cosmopolitan duty toward indigenous peoples involves, and to what extent these peoples can use such an ethic when asserting their autonomy by right of self-determination, understood as a relational goal of substantive equality or non-domination, not as an exclusionary claim of non-interference (Young 2004).

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**Natalie Ralph**

Deakin University, Australia

### **Limitations to Cosmopolitanism as a Foundation for Theory on Extractive Transnational Corporations as 21st Century Peacemakers?**

In recent years, an interesting and controversial debate has developed on the role of business, particularly Transnational Corporations (TNCs), in protecting and promoting human rights and reducing violence in intra-state conflict. Some theorists have come to regard business as a potential key actor in peacebuilding and, as this paper will suggest, could potentially also be viewed as key to enhancing processes of peacemaking (including dialogue between warring parties and peace negotiations). This is a new area for business, but one which could benefit many people suffering in violent conflict, support economic development in conflict prone countries and enhance a company's bottom-line.

While cosmopolitanism may be viewed as a strong foundation for a new theoretical debate regarding the role of TNCs in peacemaking (and peacebuilding in general), theoretical analysis *must* be more holistic in approach. Analysis must therefore incorporate discussion on theories of Corporate Social Responsibility and business ethics, global governance, multi-track diplomacy, conflict transformation interventions and peace studies. However, currently there is little research available in this area. There exists a 'black hole' in theoretical perspectives which resists the potentially increasing role that TNCs can play in peacemaking. Consequently, while focusing on extractive TNCs, this paper will propose a new theory, building from cosmopolitanism as the foundation, and which will enable the development of corporate principles and a practical framework for use by TNCs and other actors (including the United Nations, home and host governments, civil society and socially responsible investors). These principles and framework will assist TNCs to support and increase positive engagement between warring parties in intra-state conflict towards the goal of creating sustainable peace.

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**Rajmohan Ramanathapillai**  
Gettysburg College, USA

### **Buddha behind the Barb wire: A case study of Trincomallee crisis in Sri Lanka**

Should Buddha be defended violently? If we did, then should we call Buddhism as a religion of nonviolence? This paper will focus on defensive Buddhism and its consequences to ethnic violence and peace talks in Sri Lanka. Last May, a Buddha statue secretly erected overnight by the Sinhala Buddhists middle of the town, created violent backlash between Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil Hindus in Trincomalle. A bomb was thrown at the Buddha later triggered a cycle of violence that cost lives and injuries. In response, over thousands of Buddhist dominated Sri Lankan army was bought to the small town and fully geared personals were speared out in very 200 yards covered doorsteps of home, school and workplace in this small town. Apprehension and fear swell among Hindus. They plea the government to remove the Buddha, instead the area of the statue was transformed in to military zone and the Buddha was guarded and barricaded behind barbwire, sand bags, boots and assault M16. This paper will investigate the problems of defensive Buddhism of Sri Lanka and will argue that efficient way to spread the message of Buddha and peace to accept and appreciate the diversity of religious practices in Sri Lanka. A violent method of spreading and defending Buddhism undermine the goal Buddha aim to achieve.

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**William Ransome,**  
Queensland University of Technology, Australia

### **Cosmopolitanism as a Virtue**

Contemporary moral and political ideals of cosmopolitanism are deeply embedded in the modern conception of ethics as properly concerned with the elaboration of deontic principles of right and wrong conduct. Whilst these modern conceptions are already theoretically well-grounded, the recent revival of philosophical interest in the virtues offers an opportunity to pursue a potentially fruitful alternative account of cosmopolitanism as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense. On Aristotle's account, a virtue is a deeply ingrained, habituated state of character (*hexis*), central to a flourishing life (*eudaimonia*), which disposes its possessor to express appropriate emotional responses (NE 1105b25-6) and thus act well. Conceived from the possessor's point of view, virtue lies intermediate between two extremes of vice, one of excess and the other of deficiency (NE 1106a26-b28). This is Aristotle's oft-cited 'doctrine of the mean'; a classic example is found in the virtue of courage, which concerns the emotion of fearfulness, resting between the vices of cowardice (excess) and rashness (deficiency).

On my rendering of an Aristotelian account, cosmopolitanism is conceived as a virtue concerned with emotional responses to foreignness, striking a mean between the vices of extreme hostility and indiscriminate approval. These two vices are on display to varying degrees across contemporary global society; consistently hitting the mean is both exceptionally challenging and exceedingly rare. I explain some of the advantages of conceiving cosmopolitanism as an Aristotelian virtue, and consider some important objections revolving around considerations of subjectivity and objectivity, specificity and applicability. For Aristotle, what counts as striking the mean and acting virtuously in particular circumstances is determined by practical wisdom (*phronêsis*). I suggest that Kant offers a compelling deontic standard for practically wise cosmopolitanism, which is also especially useful in circumstances where virtue is rare and rational self-control (*enkrateia*) is the Aristotelian order of the day.

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**Jack Roberts,**

The University of Melbourne, Australia

### **The role of public relations in war: Government communication in Australia and the Iraq War (2003)**

From the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the use of modern public relations practices in the context of war has been justified as protecting the security of the nation-state. However, it has often also promoted a Manichean world-view in which the enemy is seen as evil. In 2003, a 'coalition of the willing' including the US, Britain and Australia invaded Iraq, beginning a war which persists until now.

On the eve of the war, Prime Minister John Howard justified Australia's involvement as a crucial step to counter the 'twin evils' of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this paper, I examine government communication in Australia during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I ask: How can we make sense of the role of public relations in this case? I outline a framework for analysing public relations based on the Foucauldian analytic of 'governmentality' drawing on post-Foucauldian theorists, Rose and Dean – who studied modern liberal politics – and histories of public relations by Ewen, Chomsky and Alex Carey. I then apply this framework in a case study of Australian government communication in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this study, I analyse interviews with senior officials from the former Howard Government who were involved in these communication activities and with other former and serving officials – and public relations practitioners – who were familiar with this case.

I argue that the 'governmentality' analytic provides a crucial basis for understanding these interventions as it uncovers many of the complexities of societal power relationships and how they were played out in public relations programs in this case. The implication of this argument is that the framework may well prove useful for analysing the role that public relations plays in war and in particular, how it relates to the promotion of cosmopolitan values.

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**Maria Rodrigues**

The University of Melbourne, Australia

### **Goal-Based Global Justice**

Many theories of global justice seek to draw a number of universal principles from common human features, such as needs, interests, capabilities or values. These features claimed as 'common' run into some controversy in cross-cultural dialogues, and are sometimes accused

of being 'West-centric' accounts. Regardless of whether such claims are accurate, the controversies resulting from such claims create grave obstacles for the practical enactment of these approaches. A more pragmatic approach to global justice may, instead, limit itself to a set of basic goals that preserve what is necessary for any cultural community to thrive: a liveable planet.

During this presentation, I will present empirical evidence that a goal to preserve the planet must also necessarily entail goals to reduce poverty and violent conflict. Given the pressing threat posed to all peoples by global warming and other forms of ecological destruction, a common human goal to preserve our planet may provide a foundation for global justice that requires no breach of loyalty to any particular cultural community, while still offering a logical critical standard for human corporate behaviour. Using Gordon Allport's concentric circles of loyalty, I will present an argument for why such a minimalist approach may be crucial to motivating the global population to take steps toward global justice.

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**Richard Shapcott**

University of Queensland, Australia

### **Cosmopolitan constitutions**

Immanuel Kant in *Perpetual peace* argued that peace between nations can only hold when “the civil constitution of every nation should be republican”. According to Kant the constitutions of republics as ‘rightful’ states created disincentives upon states to seek war with other republican states (this theory has been revised in the called democratic peace literature. Where democratic states are substituted for republican ones. In both arguments it appears that merely by virtue of being republican or democratic states peace is guaranteed. However in both arguments no specific constitutional requirements other than republicanism or democracy are required of states to ensure their peaceful interaction. Following Kant’s observation that moral action is more likely to occur under moral constitutions it follows that there is no reason not to go beyond the basic principles of representative government if we wish to ensure the moral actions of states. This project explores the possibility that cosmopolitan, republican states, need to incorporate explicit cosmopolitan elements into their constitutions in order to place a further limit on their relations with outsiders

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**Daniel W. Skubik,**

California Baptist University, USA

### **Is Islamic Banking Kosher?**

Shariah-compliant or Islamic banking products and services represent a relatively recent, and arguably welcome, set of financial alternatives for investors and consumers. Yet, such options are readily available only in select economies, such as Dubai, Kuala Lumpur, and London, though the number of financial institutions offering such products and services is growing and their effective reach is expanding even further. For all its gain in popularity, just what constitutes shariah-compliance: how is it defined, practiced, and regulated? It seems not all key players whether national financial oversight authorities, international governmental and national non-governmental organizations, individual banks or consortia and their supervisory boards, or institutional and individual investors and consumers are agreed. The results of these disagreements could be seriously detrimental to the growth of the sector on a more global scale. Conversely, some key disagreements may actually result in beneficial diversity of options, rather than formalized global homogeneity. How might that work? Based on analysis of the commercial and legal worlds of kosher foods, analogical principles and practices are

drawn, suggesting ways forward that could benefit the growing Islamic banking industry overall, as well as servicing diverse needs of investors and consumers across multiple jurisdictions.

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**Steven Slaughter**

Deakin University, Australia

### **Reconsidering the State: Cosmopolitanism, Republicanism and Global Governance**

Cosmopolitan arguments for global forms of democracy and governance have intensified in the last decade because of the increasing significance of transnational interconnections and the increased impact of global problems. However, questions remain as to how cosmopolitan structures are going to be realized in practice, given the continued significance of the state in global politics. This paper advocates the importance of considering republican arguments for redeveloping the state alongside the proposals for global democratic structures advocated by political cosmopolitans such as David Held. It contends that many forms of cosmopolitan thought are too quick to dismiss the state as a potential locus of ethical global governance and that republican conceptions of the state and political practice are important counterpoints to political cosmopolitanism.

Consequently, this paper critically considers the assumptions embedded in the literature of political cosmopolitanism in relation to the proposals for global democracy and governance. Then the paper considers republican arguments that developing civically minded citizens and responsive state institutions could be a crucial foundation for transnational forms of governance to be realized in practice. The paper then concludes by considering the practical tensions between republican and cosmopolitan proposals.

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**Robert Sparrow**

Monash University, Australia

### **If people were movies? Free speech and free association**

It is a noteworthy feature of debates around borders and sovereignty since the 1980s that the movement of labour has generally proved much more controversial than the movement of capital. An important early 1990s collection on the ethics of transnational flows of money and people focused on the normative significance, if any, of this distinction in treatment (Barry & Goodin 1992). The introduction to the collection set out what Goodin called “the requirement of symmetry” (Goodin 1992). Symmetry demands that—in the absence of a compelling argument to show otherwise—political thinkers should respond to the movement of capital, in the form of cross-border financial flows, and the movement of labour, in the same way. The failure of many political theorists to do this, cries out for explanation and justification. I believe that the requirement of symmetry may have more to teach us than this initial exploration suggested.

I will argue that there is a case to be made for symmetry in relation to the movement of cultural goods across national borders and the movement of people. There is an under-acknowledged tension between liberal hostility to restrictions on cross-border flows of knowledge, information, and entertainment and the willingness of many liberals to accept the right of the state to restrict immigration. When China tries to block access to content on various foreign websites or when Iran moves to restrict the sale of Western literature on the grounds that it is “contrary to national values”, there is a broad liberal consensus that this is a bad thing. Yet restrictions on the movement of *people* in order to preserve the character of a

national culture are much more widely accepted. The differences in the way these two sorts of movement are treated in contemporary political discourse suggests that “if people were movies”, restrictions on the movement of people around the world might be challenged more often and more powerfully.

What is ultimately at stake in arguments about the movement of both people and cultural groups is the appropriate response to the prospect of cultural transformation. Symmetry requires that we respond to the “threat” of cultural change in the same way regardless of its source. Moreover, both the free movement of cultural goods and free movement of people across borders can be understood as a consequence of commitment to important individual rights that liberals defend within the context of liberal state: freedom of speech, and freedom of association. We should therefore respond to the different sorts of cross-border flows which fall under each of these rights in the same way. I consider possible grounds for the existing asymmetries in the treatment of immigration and the movement of cultural goods and argue that they are much less compelling than is generally believed.

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### **Edward Spence**

University of Twente, Netherlands

### **Cosmopolitanism Online: Cosmopolitanism and Global Ethics**

Multiculturalism has been widely proposed as one way toward the goal of cultivating greater participation in and democratic “ownership” of a shared national or state *identity*—one that counter-balances the centripetal pull toward fracture and conflict, especially in multi-cultural state conglomerates such as the EU and multi-cultural countries such as the USA and Australia.

Yet in its present form, multiculturalism allows for separation at best and conflict at worst between different communities. In contrast to Multiculturalism, Cosmopolitanism offers a conceptually promising model for developing a more unitary notion of citizenship and democratic participation. With its central claim that all human beings by virtue of being human are “Citizens of the World”, Cosmopolitanism can be conceptually modified to a more modest model of *State Cosmopolitanism*, which recognizes the constraints and practicality of political borders.

Beyond that, however, a secondary object of this paper is to articulate the concept of *Global Cosmopolitanism* in terms of a model of *Global Ethics* I developed in (Spence 2007) and assess its potential for mitigating inter-communal conflict. Given widespread access and its inherently border-transcending nature, the Internet is an ideal medium for the cultivation of cosmopolitanism on a global scale. Thus, this part of the paper is designed to analyze the potential of the Internet to overcome communication gaps and foster a *cosmopolitan ethical identity* that transcends state and national boundaries.

Finally, the paper will address one of the major conceptual and practical problems for cosmopolitanism, especially with regard to its global scope – the problem of motivation. Even if people are willing to acknowledge the moral justification of cosmopolitanism in principle at least, why would they be motivated to accept cosmopolitanism as a practical option if it seems to go against their self-interest both individually and collectively? This part of the paper will explore how the notion of *online friendship* cultivated perhaps initially in a virtual environment such as *Second Life* might not provide an intermediary motivational step towards the more general motivational acceptance of cosmopolitanism.

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**Joanna Tice**

Wesleyan University, USA

“No Human is Illegal”

**Autonomy, Access and Egalitarian Reciprocity:**

Criticism & Analysis of Seyla Benhabib’s Discourse Ethics of Migration

This article critically analyzes deliberative democratic theorists’ recent work on the issues of cosmopolitanism, specifically the ethical treatment of *remainders*. I will argue that several pre-conditions for deliberative democracy are absent from typical contexts of undocumented immigration, thus making discourse ethics – specifically the balance of interests it strikes for the paradox of democratic legitimacy – not an effective validation procedure for norms of cosmopolitanism, especially not for the normatively prescribed treatment of remainders.

Seyla Benhabib – one of the central proponents of deliberative democratic theories of cosmopolitanism – defines the premise behind discourse ethics in her book *The Rights of Others*. Her premise lies in *the principle of egalitarian reciprocity*, which holds that, “...in discourses each [actor] should have the same rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the conversations.”

This article argues that in order for *the principle* to be upheld, immigrants must be autonomous and must have access to the discourse in the first place; deliberative democracy fails in its effort to cosmopolitanize democratic nation-states because the pre-conditions of *the principle* are unachievable in typical scenarios of undocumented immigration, such as the one between Mexico and the United States. Thus, the premise is invalidated by its context.

To give a detailed account, the *principle* is violated because, A) the contextual power structures surrounding undocumented immigration – namely capitalism and statism – overdetermine the individual autonomy that is necessary for *the principle* to be applied to a discourse. Secondly, B) the *principle* is invalidated because the literal (legal) exclusion of undocumented immigrants from a public discourse that will determine their fate logistically disallows for *the principle* to be fulfilled.

Thus, immigrants are placed in a paradox when it comes to their democratic-discursive involvement. The tenuousness of their status doesn’t allow them to participate in the discourse, and yet, participating would be the only means of ensuring a more stable and secure status. For example, before a discourse on health care policy for undocumented immigrants can be initiated, the immigrants’ participation in the discourse – and their health and safety during that participation – needs to be secured.

Benhabib’s energy would be better directed towards composing a programmatic theory, as a *formula of insurance*, to guarantee that the pre-conditions of *the principle of egalitarian reciprocity* are in place before the content of such a discourse is ever discussed, thus releasing immigrants from the paradox and securing the pre-conditions that allow discourse ethics to function. Additionally, this article shows that because of the coercive powers of the free-market system, Benhabib’s balance would have to be drawn at open borders instead of the “more porous” compromise she arrives at. This openness, in turn, would have a relaxing effect on the tension within the paradox of remainders’ interests.

**Michael Ure**

University of Queensland, Australia

### **The Lessons of Classical Cosmopolitanism**

The ideal of a cosmopolitan ethic has its roots in the ancient school of Stoicism. In this paper I want to examine how the original Cynic-Stoic idea of cosmopolitanism might bear upon contemporary cosmopolitanism. I suggest that Stoic doctrine has some troubling implications for contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism. We can identify these troubles by exploring the relationship between Stoicism's normative ideal of detachment and self-sufficiency and its commitment to cosmopolitan citizenship. Stoic cosmopolitanism hinges on the claim that citizens can exercise universal respect if and only if they extirpate their passions. The Stoics maintain that (1) membership of and participation in the *cosmopolis* turns on achieving *apatheia* - or detachment from external 'indifferents'; and (2) by corollary, that failure to achieve this detachment leaves one vulnerable to all the passions that prevent us from treating others with equal respect. We cannot become cosmopolitans without first becoming indifferent to our own and other's suffering.

It follows that recent theories suggesting that universal respect can and should be based on compassion or sympathy radically subvert the foundations of original Greek and Roman theory of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, if the Greek and Roman Stoics are correct, the contemporary claim that we can establish trans-national solidarity through the cultivation of compassion is deeply misguided. Orthodox Stoicism seems to suggest that it is self-defeating to appeal to compassion as the basis of universal respect. According to Stoic orthodoxy, the same cognitive judgements that underpin compassion also stoke vengeful passions. If we insist on cultivating compassion for undeserved suffering, they argue, then by the very same stroke we also promote anger over our own or others' misfortunes, and with it the desire for retaliation and revenge. On this basis, the Stoics argue that wherever we find compassion we also find the capacity for vengefulness. Returning to classical Stoicism compels us to re-examine cosmopolitanism's cognitive and emotional foundations.

This paper explores these foundations by addressing the following questions: Is compassion compatible with universal respect (cosmopolitanism)? Is the connection between compassion and vengefulness inextricable? If so, what role might 'negative' emotions like anger and resentment play in a cosmopolitan political *ethos*? Can we modify, cultivate or 'moralise' compassion in such way that it can be yoked to a cosmopolitan *ethos* of universal recognition? Or does cosmopolitanism rest on the kind of Stoic *apatheia* or indifference that most contemporary defenders of cosmopolitanism would find theoretically and practically unpalatable?

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**Stan van Hooft**

Deakin University Australia

**Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Recognition:** An application of the social theory of Axel Honneth to global justice, arguing that development goals must include provision for the intersubjective recognition required for identity formation.

In the disciplines of Political Philosophy and International Relations cosmopolitanism is often defined as the view that all people, no matter their national, ethnic or religious backgrounds and no matter what their gender, have an equal moral status. The most telling enunciation of this view is the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the focus that is given to rights and a global form of legal equality by this document and by such theorists as John Rawls is not rich enough to capture all of the ethical demands that global society places upon well-to-do Westerners and developed nations.

This paper makes use of a thesis by Axel Honneth to the effect that political thinking needs “a basic conceptual shift to the normative premises of a theory of recognition that locates the core of all experiences of injustice in the withdrawal of social recognition, in the phenomena of humiliation and disrespect.” Honneth identifies three spheres of recognition in modern societies: love, law, and achievement. I offer some exposition of his theory and briefly relate these three spheres to the ethical theories of Levinas, Kant and Aristotle respectively. I then argue that global justice must be understood to embrace the substantive ethical values that arise in these three spheres as well as the procedural standards of moral rightness that belongs to the second of them. Such an expanded conception of global justice also yields an enriched conception of cosmopolitanism.

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**Wim Vandekerckhove**

Ghent University, Belgium

### **Toward a Cosmopolitan Business Ethics**

Within the field of global ethics, cosmopolitanism is an important notion underpinning attempts to formulate morally sound individual and collective positions with regard to current global problems. Today, political philosophers use the cosmopolitan position to argue for specific policy options with regard to which institution should figure in global governance, for example with regard to just and sustainable development. By doing so, they imagine that it is up to individuals to strive for specific institutional arrangements at the level of national governments and intergovernmental organisations. However, what their analysis misses is any attention or consideration for other levels of economic human activity relevant to development issues. By now a consensus is growing that business has a huge positive role to play in the human striving for fair and sustainable development. Hence it is awkward that the notion of cosmopolitanism has not been taken up within business ethics.

This paper attempts to start fill that lacuna by using a model that comprises four dimensions of economic activity: 1) the supra-organisational dimension (policies and practices at national and intergovernmental level structuring the ‘playing field’ for businesses), 2) the inter-organisational dimension (practices and interaction patterns between business organisations or between businesses and governments or NGOs), 3) intra-organisational dimension (practices and interaction patterns within business organisations), 4) sub-organisational dimension (consumption patterns, life styles and standard, social cohesions).

After briefly sketching this model, the paper submits actions, attitudes and positions for all four dimensions of economic activity that could be argued as cosmopolitan. In order to facilitate this, the paper introduces the notion of ‘cosmopolitan aspiration’ so as to allow the formulation of cosmopolitan duties for non-human actors (such as organisations) towards humans. Humans hold ‘cosmopolitan aspirations’ when they aspire to be treated as citizens of the world, meaning that they aspire their agency not to be reduced to their ethnic or religious background, their socio-economic status, or the geopolitical context they happen to be situated in. Cosmopolitan duties for organisations (non-human actors) then are the duties to facilitate these cosmopolitan aspirations (of human actors).

The contribution of this paper to the literature lies herein that it:

- enriches the global ethics debate to include in a more constructive way the role of business organisations to human wellbeing,
- enriches the business ethics literature to integrate an important and widely used notion within the global ethics debate, thereby potentially linking two streams of literature,
- offer a new way of conceptualising corporate social responsibility and development,

- provide a model to reflect on and evaluate the humanising of business starting from the notion of human agency rather than human rights.
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### **An Verlinden**

Ghent University, Belgium

### **Global Movement and International Borders: Towards an Ethics of Hospitality**

Liberal theories in the context of international migration are conceptually divided between liberal-communitarians (e.g. M. Walzer, D. Miller) and liberal-cosmopolitans (e.g. J. Carens, Ch. Beitz). Both positions start from an ideal theory of justice – justice as dependent on the social context of a particular society on the one hand and justice as Kantian impartiality on the other – and focus on the question whether to open borders and to what extent.

The problem with such ideal theories, however, is that their ontological and epistemological foundationalism neglects the impact of historical, cultural and social contingencies on human reflection. Therefore, the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate on international migration ends up in an *impasse* within liberalism, offering few help in dealing with concrete migration dilemmas.

In order to move from ideal theory to non-ideal praxis, this paper argues for a ‘third way’ approach that focuses on the *lived* reality of people. This ‘third way’ aims at tackling the tension between the universalizing trend of moral principles and the particularizing trend of institutions, cultures and practices through a contextual, action-oriented method of ‘moving back and forward’ between those two opposites. This method is based on the dialogical philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas and Martin Buber, which both defend an ethics of responsibility as generosity and hospitality towards the ‘other’. The paper explores how the dialogical approach can avoid the communitarian-cosmopolitan deadlock in immigration ethics.

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### **John Williams**

Singapore Management University

### **& T. Brian Mooney**

Singapore Management University

### **Assymetrical Friendships: Problems for Cosmopolitanism**

Recent moral philosophy focusing on the value of friendship has applied Aristotelian conceptions of friendship in a variety of ways. Central to such conceptions is the idea that friendship must be based on equality (and, in particular, equality of virtue). This appears to rule out a number of important forms of friendship - friendship with bad people, friendship in carer/patient roles, and between parents and their adult children to name just a few. It is not just equality that rules out such forms of friendship but also the deemed lack of autonomy, assymetry in power, and psychological differences that render such "friendships" less than true friendship. I think this analysis is deeply suspect because it fails to recognise our deepest intuitions about ineradicable particularity in friendship. This paper will explore these issues and discuss them as presenting serious challenges to cosmopolitanism.

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**Hektor K. T. Yan**

City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR

**Cosmopolitanism and what it means to be human: Rethinking ancient and modern views on discerning humanity**

Considering the fact that cosmopolitanism can be understood in various ways in popular discourse, this paper takes a conceptual look at cosmopolitanism and the related issue of what it is to be human in order to arrive at a conceptual framework which is both theoretically sound and applicable in the contemporary world. It begins with a discussion of the different contexts in which talks of cosmopolitanism arise: while cosmopolitanism is often invoked as an alternative to patriotic or nationalistic sentiments, it is also an implicit issue surrounding the more ambiguous and broad-ranging discussion on the fundamental nature or alleged unity of human beings.

Through the examination of a picture of human beings from Homer's *Iliad*, this paper reconsiders the view that instead of using cosmopolitan beliefs as *premises* in ethical and political arguments, it is possible for a version of cosmopolitanism to be taken as an ethical ideal to strive for. While this position acknowledges the fact that the grounds for cosmopolitanism or human unity are not self-evident, it has the important characteristic of not being based on a biological or scientific perspective which otherwise forms the backbone of many contemporary ethical views on what it means to be human. This ancient view finds contemporary parallels in the works of a group of philosophers from a Wittgensteinian background: their major theses call attention to the short-comings of a view on humanity based on an empiricist or scientific outlook. As an example, racism will be discussed from such a philosophical perspective in order to highlight its distinctive conceptual features. First, the Wittgensteinian approach redirects our attention to the importance of some fundamentally human attributes and abilities. Second, it invites us to re-examine the relationship between empirical (or scientific) beliefs and the notion of human beings in a radical manner. Third, it sheds light on the very foundation of human and ethical values. While this perspective cannot be readily termed cosmopolitan, it is hoped that it can offer constructive criticisms to contemporary versions of cosmopolitanism.

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**Raymond Younis**

Central Queensland University, Australia

**The Idols of the Tower : On the “Global Knowledge Cosmopolis” (GKC), “Internationalisation” and the Question of Ethics**

In *Novum Organum*, Francis Bacon presented his well known account of the four Idols of error. I will argue that it is possible to posit a fifth, the “Idol of the Tower”, and relate it to some emerging trends in higher education. There is much talk nowadays about internationalisation, globalised knowledge systems and cosmopolitanism, understood in relation to tolerance and diversity or more broadly in terms of emancipation and consciousness raising pedagogical approaches; or in relation to the dissemination of knowledge and learning in increasingly diversified environments. Yet such exciting and thought provoking developments have their (sharp) critics. For example, in a number of recent essays in the press some notable scholars and commentators (for example, Tony Burch and Bob Birrell) have argued that the new “internationalism”, if one may call it that, has led to declining standards and higher fail rates. But even if such arguments are true, what are the ethical and the pedagogical implications of undermining such developments in higher education, particularly in relation to multiculturalism and our explicit socio-political commitments in this sphere? Moreover, are these critiques, at times damning, *actually valid*, and if not, what are the implications in ethical and pedagogical terms, of situating them and giving them such prominence in, a widely disseminated

rhetorically charged discourse in the public sphere, which is often not very well equipped to deal with questions of validity, rigour, cogency, coherence and truth?

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