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No. 2014_6   (Download full text)
Craig A. Gallet and Hristos Doucouliagos
THE INCOME ELASTICITY OF AIR TRAVEL: A META-ANALYSIS
There is much disparity in estimates of the income elasticity of air travel across the literature. We examine this disparity by applying meta-regression techniques. Controlling for several issues, including publication selection bias, while our preferred baseline income elasticity estimate of 1.186 is consistent with air travel being a luxury and a slightly immature market, there are several features of the literature which sway the income elasticity away from this baseline. For instance, the income elasticity increases to 1.546 on international routes, yet decreases to 0.633 when air fare is included in a dynamic specification of demand, ceteris paribus. Other characteristics of the literature, such as those involving various data and estimation choices, have less influence on the reported income elasticity.
Keywords: income elasticity, air travel, meta-regression analysis
No. 2014_5   (Download full text)
Zohid Askarov and Hristos Doucouliagos
Development Aid and Growth in Transition Economies
Empirical studies normally analyze diverse and heterogeneous groups of countries, producing very mixed evidence on the effectiveness of development aid in promoting growth. We focus on whether aid promotes economic growth in transitional economies. We find that aid, on average, has had a positive impact on growth for this specific group of countries. This result is robust to samples, estimators, and the use of alternate instruments to address endogeneity. Aid effectiveness is not conditional on good policy and there is little evidence of non-linear growth effects arising from aid.
No. 2014_4   (Download full text)
Randy Silvers and Raul Susmel
Compensation of a Manager: The Case of Major League Baseball
In this paper, we are interested in the impact a Major League Baseball (MLB) manager has on a team’s outcome. Using data on manager’s contracts, team performance, and team and manager characteristics, first, we determine the variables that determine a manager's salary. Then, we use a forecasting-type analysis to study the determinants of a manager’s performance, measured by winning percentage, attendance or playoff appearances. We find that a manager's past performance affects his current salary, but his current salary does not affect the team's performance. Our results support the lack of a competitive and efficient market for MLB managers.
No. 2014_3   (Download full text)
MAYULA CHAIKUMBUNG, HELEN SCARBOROUGH and CHRIS DOUCOULIAGOS
Incorporating cultural values and preferences in wetland valuation and policy
This paper reports the findings of a choice modelling study designed to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improvement of the ecosystem services of Bung Khong Long wetland in Thailand. The findings indicate that the cultural values associated with the wetland are significant suggesting that incorporating culture preferences may be a key factor in supporting wetland conservation. Attitudinal characteristics of respondents are important factors influencing WTP, implying community preferences are important in the effectiveness of environmental conservation efforts for this community.
Keywords: Wetland valuation, Cultural values, Choice modelling
No. 2014_2   (Download full text)
Emin Gahramanov and Xueli Tang
Impatient in Experiments, but Patient in Simulations: A Challenge to a Neoclassical Model.
Despite ample empirical evidence on the prevalence of high discount rates among people, applied, quantitative-theoretical macro studies with exponential discounting often assume low positive, or even negative discount rate values. Relying on recent advances from the numerical optimal control branch of mathematics, we solve a neoclassical, continuous time model of endogenous consumption/saving and labor supply, and show that even if an agent has a moderately high discount rate, his labour supply and consumption behavior will be highly counterfactual. We provide a remedy to such counterfactual findings by augmenting a standard utility function based on recent evidences from the leisure sciences, while maintaining a rational choice approach of neoclassical economics.
JEL-Codes: D91, C02, C61, J22, J26
Keywords: Bounded control; Numerical Optimal Control; Life-cycle Consumption and Labor-Leisure
No. 2014_1   (Download full text)
Emin Gahramanov and Xueli Tang
Career Interruptions: A Neglected Aspect of a Neoclassical Model
There is voluminous literature on the reasons behind career interruptions, ranging from maternity leave and organizational layoffs, to national service and human capital acquisition. We show that a standard, neoclassical model of intertemporal consumption/saving and labor/leisure choices without any friction can generate multiple career interruptions as a natural outcome of a consumption/leisure smoothing exercise performed by perfectly rational agents. Given the complexity of such a model, and to be consistent with traditions from the optimal control branch of mathematics, we use advances in numerical optimal control to solve a neoclassical problem.
JEL-Codes: J22, J26, D91, C02, C61
Keywords: Career interruptions; Life-cycle consumption and labor-leisure; Bounded control; Pseudospectral optimal control.
No. 2013_9   (Download full text)
Aaron Nicholas, Ranjan Ray and Kompal Sinha
Duration and Multidimensionality in Poverty Measurement
This paper unites two strands of the literature on subgroup decomposable poverty measurement originating from Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) by incorporating information on both multiple dimensions and multiple periods. This generalises the Alkire and Foster (2011a) measure into a dynamic setting. In doing so, it introduces two variants of the ‘transfer’ axiom: one that gives increasing weight to individuals whose deprivations are concentrated as repeated dimensions in a specific period (what we term ‘breadth’) versus one that gives increasing weight to individuals whose deprivations are concentrated as repeated periods in a specific dimension (‘length’). The measure is able to differentiate between both aspects of poverty and consequently allows the assignment of different weights to each aspect. This makes it well suited to make comparison across subgroups when individual longitudinal data is available. We apply the proposed measure to longitudinal data from China where we compare differences in the estimate of poverty relative to existing measures.
JEL-Codes: I31, I32
Keywords: Multidimensional Poverty; Duration of Poverty; Transfer Axiom; Subgroup Decomposability
No. 2013_8   (Download full text)
Cong S. Pham and Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu
THE ROLE OF ENDOWMENTS, TECHNOLOGY AND SIZE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW EVIDENCE FROM PRODUCT-LEVEL DATA
Using product-level trade data, we empirically investigate the export patterns of more than 150 countries in their exports to the U.S., Brazil, India and Japan. We document strong evidence that exporters specialize according to their relative factor endowments, technology, and economic size. Moreover, developed, economically larger, and technologically-advanced countries are the major exporters of new products, spanning a wide range of product categories with high unit values. Our findings constitute a building block for the phenomenon that a large proportion of the global trade takes place among developed economies, and that the latter are also major exporters to developing markets.
JEL-Codes: F11, F2, C21
No. 2013_7   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci, Nick Feltovich and Mehmet Y. Gurdal
The contractor game: a theoretical and experimental analysis
We introduce the contractor game , related to the ultimatum game (UG). The proposer makes an offer , and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message , indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before accepting or rejecting the offer. We theoretically examine versions with p = 0 and p = 0.5 along with the UG, played by some standard economic agents and others who are averse to inequity, lies and lying. The equilibria yield intuitive predictions, which are supported by our experimental results. Offers are higher when they might be seen by the responder. Messages over–state offers, but less so when the offer might be seen. Responders are more likely to accept an unseen offer if it might have been seen. When offers are seen, responders reward truthful messages, rather than punishing lies, compared to when no message is sent.
JEL-Codes: C72, C78, D82
Keywords: ultimatum game, messages, lies, truth–telling, other–regarding behaviour
No. 2013_6   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci, Pedro Gomis-Porqueras and Marcus Pivato
Formal and Informal Markets: A Strategic and Dynamic Perspective
In formal markets, to attract buyers, sellers must publicly advertise their prices and locations. But in informal markets, sellers must remain anonymous from government authorities. Since agents' payoffs depend on the ratio of buyers and sellers in each of these markets, all agents try to position themselves in the market which can yield them the highest possible payoff. This strategic interaction in turn critically affects the time evolution of these two markets. In our benchmark model, in which only sellers can switch between these markets, there exists a unique stable dynamic equilibrium where formal and informal markets co-exist. Sellers switch from the formal to the informal market whenever costs of trading in the informal market decrease, and vice versa. In a richer environment, where both sellers and buyers can switch between markets, and the sellers' and buyers' costs of trading in the formal market net of those in the informal market have opposite signs, there exists a unique stable dynamic equilibrium where formal and informal markets co-exist.
JEL-Codes: C7, D49
Keywords: Price posting, bargaining, matching, formal sector, informal sector
No. 2013_5   (Download full text)
Emin Gahramanov and Xueli Tang
Solving for the Retirement Age in a Continuous-time Model with Endogenous Labor Supply
This paper studies a continuous-time life-cycle model with a consumption-leisure choice made by a finitely-lived agent with a random lifetime. We explicitly account for the leisure constraint in the corresponding constrained optimal control problem with a commonly postulated solution structure, and provide a complete analytic solution of the problem. By solving both the constrained and unconstrained control formulations, we demonstrate the inaccuracy of the latter formulation (where an unconstrained leisure path gets truncated once it exceeds the time endowment limit) can indeed be significant. For cases when the subjective discount rate is quite close to or exceeds the interest rate, the optimal control path would not be consistent with the structure of the optimal solution so commonly postulated in applied studies.
JEL-Codes: D91, C02, C61, J22, J26
Keywords: Constrained control; Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle; Life-cycle consumption and labor- leisure
No. 2013_4   (Download full text)
Pedro Gomis Porqueras, Solmaz Moslehi and Richard M. H. Suen
Endogenous Health in a Model of Calories, Medical Services and Health Shocks
This paper presents a theoretical framework that incorporates both preventive actions and treatment opportunities to study health outcomes. In particular, we allow for an agent's eating decision to alter the distribution of future health shocks. Once a shock is realized medical care can be used to improve her health. Thus, choosing a healthier diet is a form of self-protection while medical expenditures are a form of self-insurance. The model helps rationalize why agents choose to be overweight even though they are fully aware of its adverse health consequences. Moreover, this framework predicts that wealthier individuals, on average, have lower morbidity rates and lead a healthier lifestyle. Finally, our numerical exercise captures U.S. cross-sectional facts regarding the choice of diet, medical expenditures as well as health and non-food expenditures.
JEL-Codes: D81, I12, J11.
Keywords: Calories, Medical Care, Health Shock.
No. 2013_3   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci, Richard Dutu and Nick Feltovich
Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation
How does the inflation tax impact on buyers’ and sellers’ behaviour? How strong is its effect on aggregate economic activity? To answer, we develop a model of directed search and monetary exchange with inflation. In the model, sellers post prices, which buyers observe before deciding on cash holdings that are costly due to inflation. We derive simple theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment. We then test the model’s predictions with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. Our main finding confirms that not only is the inflation tax harmful to the economy – with cash holdings, GDP and welfare all falling as inflation rises – but also that its effect is relatively larger at low rates of inflation than at higher rates. For instance, when inflation rises from 0% to 5%, GDP falls by 2.8 percent, an effect 5 to 7 times stronger than when inflation rises from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the inflation tax is a monetary policy channel of primary importance, even at low inflation rates.
JEL-Codes: E31, E40, C90
Keywords: money, inflation tax, directed search, posted prices, cash balances, welfare loss, frictions, experiment
No. 2013_2   (Download full text)
T.D. Stanley and Hristos Doucouliagos
Better than Random: Weighted Least Squares Meta-Regression Analysis
Our study revisits and challenges two core conventional meta-regression models: the prevalent use of ‘mixed-effects’ or random-effects meta-regression analysis (RE-MRA) and the correction of standard errors that defines fixed-effects meta-regression analysis (FE-MRA). We show how and explain why the traditional, unrestricted weighted least squares estimator (WLS-MRA) is superior to conventional random-effects (or mixed-effects) meta-regression when there is publication (or small-sample) bias and as good as FE-MRA in all cases and better in most practical applications. Simulations and statistical theory show that WLS-MRA provides satisfactory estimates of meta-regression coefficients with confidence intervals that are comparable to mixed-or random-effects when there is no publication bias. When there is publication selection bias, WLS-MRA dominates mixed- and random-effects, especially when there is large additive heterogeneity as assumed by the random-effects meta-regression model.
Keywords: meta-regression, weighted least squares, random-effects, fixed-effects
No. 2013_1   (Download full text)
T.D. Stanley and Hristos Doucouliagos
Neither Fixed nor Random: Weighted Least Squares Meta-Analysis
We show that a simple weighted least squares meta-regression is statistically superior to either conventional fixed-effects or random-effects meta-analysis. Although weighted least squares has been widely known for many decades among medical researchers, econometricians and particle physicists and its optimal statistical properties have long been established, its implications for meta-analysis have yet to be fully explored or appreciated. Our simulations demonstrate that weighted least squares is preferable to both conventional fixed- and random-effects whether or not there is excess heterogeneity. We show how this simple weighted least squares is an improvement over random-effects in the exact setting for which random-effects meta-analysis is designed.
Keywords: meta-analysis, meta-regression, weighted least squares, fixed-effects, random-effects
No. 2012_9   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun
Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program
This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.
JEL-Codes: C78; D74
Keywords: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions, Nash program, axiomatic characterization, noncooperative foundations, economics of search.
No. 2012_8   (Download full text)
Rajesh Kumar Rai and Helen Scarborough
Non-market Valuation in Developing Countries: Estimating Benefits of Managing Invasive Plants Using Choice a Choice Experiment
There are limitations associated with the application of non-market valuation techniques, including choice experiments, in subsistence economies. In part, this is due to the concern that using money as a mode of contribution may not capture the potential contribution of low-income households. To address this limitation, respondents in this study were provided with the option of contributing towards the management of invasive plants in labour terms if they were unwilling to contribute in monetary terms. The results show that the existing practice of using dollar values to estimate willingness to contribute may disproportionately exclude the concerns of some groups within the community. The analysis also indicates that allowing respondents to express their willingness to contribution in labour increases their participation in environmental decision-making processes and hence, increases the estimated value of forest ecosystem services. This study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the development of non-market valuation surveys, including CEs, in low-income countries in general and rural areas in particular.
Keywords: Choice experiments, Willingness to contribute, low-income communities, mode of contribution
No. 2012_7   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci and Ching-jen Sun
Robustness of Intermediate Agreements and Bargaining Solutions
Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the .robustness of intermediate agreements. plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified frame-work for comparing these solutions’ bargaining theories.
JEL-Codes: C78; D74
Keywords: Nash’s bargaining problem, robustness, intermediate agreements, the Discrete Raiffa solution, the Nash solution, Proportional solutions.
No. 2012_6   (Download full text)
Nejat Anbarci and Nick Feltovich
How responsive are people to changes in their bargaining position? Earned bargaining power and the 50–50 norm
Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results have come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individuals may perceive it as having been “unearned” and thus be reluctant to exploit it. Also, equal splits of the “cake” (the amount bargained over) have typically been equilibrium outcomes, leading to a powerful tendency toward 50-50 splits. We conduct a bargaining experiment in which subjects earn their bargaining power through a real–effort task. Treatments are based on the Nash demand game (NDG) and a related unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Subjects bargain over a fixed amount of money, with disagreement payments determined entirely by the number of units of the real–effort task successfully completed. Task parameters are set to allow disagreement payoffs above half the cake size, in which case 50–50 splits are not individually rational, and thus not consistent with equilibrium.
We find that subjects are least responsive to changes in own and opponent disagreement payoffs in the NDG with both disagreement payments below half the cake size. Responsiveness is higher in the UBG, and in the NDG when one disagreement payment is more than half the cake size, but in both cases it is still less than predicted. It is only in the UBG when a disagreement payment is more than half the cake size that responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real–life bargaining position is determined by past behaviour rather than luck, the extent to which actual bargaining corresponds to theoretical predictions will depend on (1) the institutions within which bargaining takes place, and (2) the distribution of bargaining power; in particular, whether the 50–50 norm yields a viable outcome.
JEL-Codes: C78, C72, D81.
Keywords: Nash demand game, unstructured bargaining, real effort, disagreement, experiment.
No. 2012_5   (Download full text)
Janto Haman, Hristos Doucouliagos and Michael Graham
Agency Problem II and Convergence in CEO Pay
Convergence in CEO pay occurs when pay differentials narrow over time. We analyze and compare differences in the rate of convergence in CEO pay of Australian listed firms with high shareholding concentration (HSC) and without, for the period 1992 to 2009. We find zero and negative pay-for-performance and pay-for-firm size associations in HSC firms, indicating entrenchment and suboptimal CEO contract design. In contrast, positive pay-for-performance effects exist in non-HSC firms. The rate of convergence in CEO pay is higher in HSC firms. While there is relatively strong investor protection, our findings indicate that Australian HSC firms face high private benefits of control and one avenue for extracting these benefits is through a higher rate of convergence in CEO pay.
JEL-Codes: G30; J33, M52
Keywords: Agency Problem II; CEO Pay; Convergence; Shareholding Concentration
 
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