Dr Francisco Andre Alves da Silva

Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification

Juan Pereyra, Francisco Silva

(2023), Vol. 18, pp. 793-836, Theoretical Economics, New Haven, Ct., C1

Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*

Samir Mamadehussene, Francisco Silva

(2023), Vol. 71, pp. 192-211, Journal of Industrial Economics, London, Eng., C1

Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?

Francisco Silva

(2023), Vol. 61, pp. 720-737, Economic Inquiry, London, Eng., C1

The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise

F Silva

(2022), Vol. 136, pp. 379-388, Games and Economic Behavior, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, C1

The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence

Francisco Silva

(2020), Vol. 12, pp. 99-113, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Nashville, Tenn., C1-1

A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE

Rodrigo Harrison, Francisco Silva

(2020), Vol. 58, pp. 745-763, ECONOMIC INQUIRY, London, Eng., C1-1

Renegotiation‐proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

F Silva

(2019), Vol. 14, pp. 971-1014, Theoretical Economics, Cleveland, Ohio, C1-1

If we confess our sins

Francisco Silva

(2019), Vol. 60, pp. 1389-1412, International Economic Review, Chichester, Eng., C1-1

Inducing overconfidence

Francisco Silva

(2017), Vol. 55, pp. 451-460, Economic Inquiry, Chichester, Eng., C1-1